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Abstract 
Through articulating what I call my weave of understanding, in this thesis I aspire to come to a new 
understanding of the relation between materiality, discourse and subjectivity as with my being 
composing a relationality that figures me a movement in and of the world. 
Inspired by Arendt’s concept of weaving in combination with Bakhtin’s notion of polyphony and what I 
call sympathetic reading as my method I interpret and entangle notions from Foucault, Butler, Spivak, 
Irigaray, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, hooks, Bhabha and Barad into what I call my weave of understanding. 
Through my weaving and entangling of notions and concepts in these theories, I find them to in a 
polyphonic sense form a new resonance that enables me to a new understanding of these concepts as an 
entangled whole that in turn enables me to come to an understanding of ontological premises of my 
being in the world. In my theoretical weaving where I read notions from these theorists through each 
other, I see what happens in the meeting of discourse, subjectivity and materiality as I find these 
concepts in notions from the theorists. I come to an understanding of them as with my being in the 
world function as a relationality, or rather that my being in the world composes this relationality.  
The thesis begins and ends with the situation of the individual in the philosophical earthly collective that 
the climate crisis symbolically poses us as, and a suggestion of how this pacifies my action into a 
discrepancy with my knowledge of the effects of my acts and thus my responsibility in this situation. 
With the conviction that the individual needs to change its attitude and act in regard to the climate crisis, 
for me this poses questions of how my action come to be, what are the premises of my agency and 
desire. The body of the text that articulate my weave of understanding and explains my being as 
composing a relationality (of materiality, discourse and subjectivity), then enable an understanding of 
how change in the world happen through my being, and how the origin of my subjectivity and thus 
performative act, can be found also in this relationality that I compose. Apart from the three concepts 
that is its focus, my weaving and understanding of my being as this relationality evolves also into 
questions of agency, accountability, ethics, (the possibility of) freedom, reflexivity, togetherness, the 
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Introduction 
In vision: A joint human kind. This, until now, impossible collective forced together through the 
consequence of what we have together created – to together be accountable, together be responsible, 
together bear the consequences – as are we together required to engage our being in solving the 
situation. This is primarily a philosophical vision; that we are together as a collective of earth at last, 
because at last we have created something together: The climate crisis. In reality we will meet the 
consequences in different ways and we will have to find different ways to make it better, because we are 
in different situations. Humanity as a collective will remain a philosophical prospect. We will never be 
we, but we are certainly here together. However I suggest that this >we> in the climate crises, as a 
powerful symbolic sign, imposes on us a problem to handle the actual situation, because in such a 
philosophical collective, I have not myself a possibility of existence. In the Hegelian dialectic where my 
own possibility is enabled only as relation to an other from me, to together meet this challenge, for us to 
come together as a collective of human or earthly kind, an alien invasion would have been required. The 
human collective is in our current state a philosophical impossibility, because to create a we, we need an 
other from it, acting upon us. This is not human kind against an >Other> from it, but human kind against 
the earthly premises that we are ourselves part of, our actions, even those that destroy that very earth, 
dependent by. It is human kind against our selves. We stand completely alone in what we have done, 
what we will have to do, together.  
  But the climate crisis does not only pose questions about togetherness, it poses questions about 
the individual in it, about me. My act and its origin, my possible freedom or non freedom and thus my 
accountability or more importantly possibility to affect and make change in this togetherness, and on 
this world. It poses the condition of my being as something that in itself is, affective to the world, but 
also that I am always in this situation of the world, and always together. One of the biggest challenges of 
climate change is that everyone feels powerless in relation to it. Paradoxically so, because we feel 
powerless in how we can act to change it while it is the consequence of our very action. The climate 
crisis, the situation and prospects of it, our reaction to it, our possibilities in relation to it, poses a 
number of philosophical questions about my own being in the world. How can I understand myself in 
this collective, do I matter? Does my force of movement come from me, and is it me or something else 
that determine that movement? Do I have possibility to change? And in that case, what are the premises 
for the origin of that creativity? I ask these questions because I am convinced that there is an urgent 
need for me to start looking at my self differently, to understand how I come to act and the role of my 
act, because I need to change my act.  
  My conviction is that I need to take myself into consideration in this crisis - myself in the 
togetherness I am part of, in the world I am in. And so my project is to consider the ontological 
composition of the being of me, the premises of my possibilities, and the origin of my act. To 
understand my changing potential I need to look at the premises of reflection, and of subjectivity as a 
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creativity made through such self-reflection – thus as affecting the world. My subjectivity needs to be 
seen as node of production, because my desire, my action is formed in this sense of my self as 
something. And this sense of myself as something, is made through my process of understanding myself 
as something distinct. This poses a problem for the future of earthly human life, when we have 
established that philosophically, at least in a symbolic manifestation, in the climate crisis we are all 
together, in the true collective of human kind. It is not only the collective posed by the climate crisis that 
is a philosophical impossibility, but >I> in that collective is. Paradoxically this prospect of earthly 
togetherness makes me unable to see my self, to self-reflect - thus to subjectively create within it. To 
understand myself, my act and possibilities, I need to relate that self to an other, in relation to what I can 
locate myself. I, as a reflection and creativity in relation to that reflection (subjectivity), am dependent 
upon the separation that such a collective cannot entail.  
  This thesis will revolve around this possibility of the subject to move the world from its own 
composition in it - together with other subjects part of it. What this situation might mean for this being 
of mine and additionally what my being might mean for this situation. Through a philosophical analysis 
I try to understand the relation between discourse, subjectivity and materiality when reading these 
concepts from different feminist poststructuralist, postcolonial and posthumanist theory, trough each 
other. The result of this entangled reading is what I call my weave of understanding through which I 
come to an understanding of how these concepts are composed as a relationality through my existence. 
Trough initiating my weaving in Foucault and Butlers understanding of discourse and subjectivity as in 
a dialectically constituting relation, I come to wonder about two of the questions that also the challenge 
of the climate crises poses to me, and that I with my weaving also come to understand as answered with 
the relationality I propose my being to compose; - Where is the origin of my subjectivity and thus 
performative act situated; - How does change occur in an understanding of discourse as offering the 
possibilities of subjectivity that so materialize discourses claim, confirming discourse? My weaving of 
this understanding will also enable me to in the end return to both the question of the impossibility of 
my creativity in relation the collective that the climate crisis poses, as well as the possibility of my 
agential freedom. 
  My intention with the name of this thesis “This Devious Subject”, is an at least three folded 
significance in it, symbolizing (some of) the thesis subjects. The thesis is initiated through speaking of a 
subject that I seem to somehow persist in having a devious relation to, in that my action slips away from 
knowledge’s requirement; my own possibility to act in regard to the climate crisis. This theme however 
is merely an initiating intrigue into the entanglement of the thesis which is to talk about the subject, me, 
as something devious, as an unrepresented and unreflected process of becoming through my very 
attempt to represent and reflect my self. This happening of the subject works almost as a metaphor for 
the third implication of the title: The referred “this” in the sentence is an ever dislocated place of 
reference, concluding meaning into an always devious process of catachresis that is, I will suggest, 
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nevertheless totally constructive through this very deviousness of understanding and performing. 
  As mentioned, my being in the world will in this weave be presented as constituting what I call a 
relationality of discourse, subjectivity and materiality where these notions function not as separate 
causes that merely affects one another, but as a relationality. That is, instead of like theories has often 
been doing, using these notions as separate existences that can explain or be the cause of each other, 
such as discourse causing the subject, or the subject causing materiality, or materiality causing 
discourse, I will understand how these three - discourse, subjectivity and materiality are inseparably 
involved in a relationality, thus that their function happen in the very relation to one another, with my 
being in the world. That is – it is my actual being that composes this relationality. Thus my 
understanding pose my being as something in it self, as something specific that does something specific 
in the world, as a result of my me, but that my being is always in the world, thus the utter dependency of 
my specificity is part of my composition.  
The subjects and motivations of this text are all involved with ethical concerns. Not only do I assume 
that current earthly life is worth to protect, something called humanity worth to rectify before it is to 
late, but the relationality that I will discuss as the premises of my being, considers the premises of my 
agency as well as my possibilities to affect in the world, thus these are also the premises of my ethical 
possibilities. The motivation of my weaving is to understand my self in the world, as to also understand 
the premises of the possibilities of how to make this being together better. But the claim of ontological 
premises, and to consider possibilities of ethics under such premises is per definition an universal(izing) 
claim, inevitably problematic in light of the contextually relative premises of value and knowledge 
pointed to by the feminist theory that I consider myself in. I am situatedly premised in a specific context 
and position in the world, from where I, also with this text, always speak, thus what I say is here 
dependent. And to analyse my making in the world, I could really only speak in terms of specificity. But 
the subject of this text is the very premises of my condition of being in the world, together, and as a 
subject speaking in this text, I am situated in this condition of being. Of course, these conditions of 
human life might at some point change (for example through meeting other intelligence, alien or 
artificial). However, my suggestion of my ontological premises of being, actually appose and undermine 
essentializing universalist claims of value and the claimed stability of such value. 
  I use notions and philosophy that both underpins and belongs to feminist theory to weave my 
understanding of the ontological situation I am in. The thesis is thus relevant for the interdisciplinary 
field of gender studies because it is rooted in its theory, but also because its theoretical implications are 
relevant for an analysis of being in the world when questions of the ontology of agency, power, 
embodiment, value/meaning, history, dominance, identity and belonging, themes that the field of gender 
studies and feminist theory revolve around, are all evoked and entangled in my weaving. In feminist 
theory I find assumptions and theories about the potential relations between subjectivity, discourse and 
materiality, are applied onto different situations of what is called a position, an intersection, a struggle or 
	   8	  
identity. To look at this very relation, and possibly understand it in a new way is thus highly relevant for 
such analysis. I so suggest that the thesis is contributing to the feminist field, through that my 
understanding of being as a relationality, is useful for any such analysis about the being of the subject.  
Aim and purpose 
The body of this thesis is the articulation of what I term my weave of understanding consisting of 
diverse but entangled theoretical notions that I read through each other. I formulate this to understand 
the premises of my actual being in the world, and thus my potential movement of it. Through reading 
theories that to me present notions of discourse, subjectivity and materiality, interpreting the meeting of 
these concepts, I see to the entanglement of these dimensions through my being, and come to an 
understanding of my being in the world through a new understanding of  these concepts as a 
relationality. 
My aim is to investigate the relation between notions of discourse, subjectivity and materiality as I have 
interpreted these notions from a number of feminist poststructuralist, postcolonial and posthumanist 
authors. Through reading these separate notions through each other I see to what happens in the meeting 
of them, and that in that meeting, a new understanding emerge. My purpose is to understand this 
meeting as a relationality. That is as a new understanding in itself that comes from my weaving these 
notions together and the questions their meeting evoke. In other words, in the articulation of my weave 
of understanding, from my aim to investigate the relation between discourse, subjectivity and 
materiality, my purpose is to find a new understanding or a notion through these notions composed into 
a meeting, as that of a relationality that explains my being in the world.  
Method, material and theory 
My research revolve around the formulation of a theoretical thesis about ontological relationalities that 
comprises my subjective interpretation and interweaving of theoretical notions deriving from 
poststructuralist, postcolonial, posthumanist theorists. The material of the main body of my thesis, the 
entanglement of theoretical notions that tells me about the relation between materiality, discourse and 
subjectivity, will be interpretations of Foucault’s theory of power and the constitution of the subject in 
it, Butler’s notion of performativity and discussion about subjection made in dependency, Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of perception, Irigaray on demarcations of difference, Derrida’s notion of the arbitrary 
sign and the symbolic system of meaning as well as catachresis, Spivak on catachresis and the claim of 
identity, Bhabha on the claim of origin, hooks on the productivity of the struggle and Barad on the 
quantum physical principal. I here need to understand the concepts of discourse, materiality and 
subjectivity as presented to me by these authors as the material I investigate, and the theories where they 
are situated as the context of my investigation. The context (theories) of my material (concepts) thus 
affect my understanding of it, however, when I in the course of my weaving transform my 
understanding of these concepts through understanding them through each other, also my understanding 
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of these author’s theories will be affected.  
  I use discourse, subjectivity and materiality as concepts in this text to understand the workings of 
discourse, subjectivity and materiality as doings in the world (indefinable phenomena that we inevitably 
and impossibly need to conceptualize to make knowledgeable), as indicated to me in the theories that is 
my material. Through so I find and pose these concepts as working as a relationality. The concepts of 
discourse, subjectivity and materiality are induced to me in the theories that is my material, when I read 
these theories in a parallel way, as if there is an ontological relation in between them, that is however 
not explained in these theories separately, and my venture is to through understanding these theories 
through each other, entangling their notions, enable an understanding of these concepts as a 
relationality. I find and enunciate the relationality of discourse, subjectivity and materiality in these 
theories through engaging in other concepts from these theories, that function also in/as this 
relationality, such as resistance, desire, catachresis, cultural practice, hybrid specificity and dialectically 
repressive and productive power. In so the three concepts is my material in that I locate and crystallize 
their relation in the theory that is so also my material, through reading these theories through each other. 
In that specific reading of the theoretical material mentioned above I find the way to understand the 
relationality that discourse-subjectivity-materiality constitute – a relationality where other concepts are 
entangled. To enunciate that relationality, is partly my attempt of the thesis. In other words there is a 
meta-dimension in my material: I use the above mentioned theories and concepts/notions presented in 
them to understand and enunciate the relationality of discourse-subjectivity-materiality that has been 
suggested to me when reading these theories in an entangled way.  
  This relationality that constitute discourse-subjectivity-materiality is so a key-dimension in what 
I call my weave of understanding, that somehow fixate the core-nodes in an entangled understanding 
that otherwise needs to be quite unfixed – because it is entangled. The aim to craft a weave where 
different theory is tied into an understanding builds on the existence of an ontological relationality 
between these three key concepts. To make it clear, this is a theoretical thesis in which I will reflect on 
theory and I will use theory to do that reflection. In the discussion, the main body of the thesis, this 
weave of understanding will be presented, meanwhile the threads that node discourse, subjectivity and 
materiality in to a relationality will be attached. I will so present a series of concepts and entangle them 
into something that I formulate as my weave of understanding, in to something specific through that 
entanglement. This is the very subject of the text. Additionally you will find readings of poststructural, 
postcolonial and posthumanist thought where I locate my notions, in the following part on previous 
research. At first I need to, as a theoretical departure, introduce the three theoretical key concepts that in 
the text involves into what I pose as a relationality. This initial introduction of my understanding of 
discourse, subjectivity and materiality as separate concepts will function as points of departure both for 
these concepts to further build on, and to introduce to the reader an initial theoretical stance. 
  Discourse – As mentioned, my thesis does assume a Foucauldian understanding of power. I will 
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concentrate on some of its operative ‘parts’, or rather the entanglements of these ‘parts’, that is to say 
the relation of discourse, knowledge and subjectivity. Knowledge and discourse as well as language here 
needs to be understood as intricately interwoven. Discourse as a language-effect is functioning under the 
secondary conceptualizing premises of language, and discourse is the manner, the way that meaning is 
temporarily distributed, organized, maintained and changed to the symbolic concepts of language. 
Likewise discourse and language is the only manner in which experience and interpretations of the 
world can be mediated and likewise put in to knowledge, which premises human knowledge and 
mediation under those same secondary premises of language and discourse. But the need for mediation 
and understanding/knowledge is, however secondary and even faulty, so also what makes discourse and 
language nevertheless necessary – its conceptualizing premise and so secondary state inevitable. What is 
understood through Foucault is how discourse structure our perception about things in the world – that 
is to say what we se as our knowledge of it – and how this structuring of our understanding so affects 
our partaking in that world, as well as how institutions in society are organized around that claimed and 
perceived knowing or ‘truth’, and so how we, through following the laws that institutions, in accordance 
with discursive claims, has set up for us and through practicing life as we, through discourse, understand 
it as right, enact those discursive claims as if true and so confirms discursive knowledge as something 
else than merely claims – as something experienced and even material. Discourse is thus dialectically 
dependent on the subject to relate to, interpret and enact its claims – to create and change them - and the 
subject equally dependent on discourse to understand and mediate the world as well as itself in it. 
Foucault shows how discursive claims has altered during history, what has been defined as madness or 
sexuality for example is totally specific to historical context, different discourses about different 
subjects in a specific context functioning as both confirming as well as changing each other to make one 
another intelligible and to make individuals able to construct themselves as >something> only ever in 
relation to these discourses. This process is so how Foucault claims that power is something that we all 
are part of, not something that someone has and others do not, even through that our very >selves> are 
enabled through it, under the limiting conditions of having such a discursively acknowledged >self> 
(Foucault [1976]2002, 1980, 2008; Derrida [1967]2016, [1972]1982; Butler [1990]2007, [1993]2011, 
2004). 
  Subjectivity – Subjectivity is the human individual relating to discursive claims, that is to say an 
abstract experience of being in the world, relating in to a >self>, or as a constant process of becoming 
that self. In my understanding, this experience is through relating to discourse enabled to create a 
position, a self, through that positioning confirming itself as a >subject>, as that of a substance, that 
>subject> being the individual within discourse, hence the defined individual/human. >The subject< is 
so made possible with discourse, but it is a being merely within discourse, whereas subjectivity is the 
process of trying to become a >subject> resulting in the actual ever making of the actual subject. In this 
text I will use the subject (without >>) to refer to my actual being. In a Butlarian and Foucauldian sense 
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>The subject>, as a defined and understood substance, is only philosophical, always only a temporary 
discursive definition or claim of definition within discourse that never actually defines (not only because 
it cannot define apart from discourses own secondary premises – but because it merely exists as an 
abstract idea of definition) while subjectivity is the actual arbitrary relating, the experience and the 
practice of that construction of >ones self>, into a becoming subject. Subjectivity so takes part in also 
constructing the material world as well as discourse when the individual performs its enactment of itself 
as a >subject>, that is to say its relating to discursive claims, that so both confirms and changes those 
discursive claims as well as materially affecting the world. In other words the process of subjectivity is a 
practice that is part of the material world as well as discourse. Crucial for the experience of subjectivity 
- intricately involved with the idea of it, is that through that we experience the world as an outside, 
because our reflective understanding (conceptualization) automatically inflicts it self as an 
understanding “of” the world, the experience of an ‘inside’ is made possible – that is the experience of 
the >self>. This >self> is so always constructed in relation to an >other> from that self, paradoxically in 
constructive dependence to this relation. Thus subjectivity is an ever relating process, philosophically 
enabled via a principal of identification through separation, affecting the world through performative 
practices. (Foucault [1976]2002, 1982, 2008; Butler 1990[2007], 1997, 2005; Spivak 1990; Braidotti 
2002) 
  Materiality – Materiality is the process of physical being in this world, where any substance or 
rather phenomena that takes up space can be said to consist of matter and so condition being as a 
process of taking of some space, affecting space as well as any experience of space, thus conditioning 
space and being in it as transformative. With a feminist quantum physical understanding, matter is not a 
fixed substance, but substance in intra-active becoming, as an ever doing that is entangled through that 
doing and that is doing because of this entanglement. Matter is thus rather ever materialization, both 
done as in taking space and at the same time never done (materialized) but in the process of doing. 
Hence material substance is actually without any >thingness> and is not a passive surface that humans 
ascribe meaning, but is indivisibly involved in meaning-making. Matter does not exist as separable 
entities that the conceptualizing of my understanding (in)ability in its defining premise makes it out as, 
however also my conceptualizing takes part in materiality (Barad 2007). In my understanding 
materiality is the part of reality that is bigger than ‘me’- the ‘me’ that perceives reality and the ‘me’ that 
is discursive – thus that is beyond the ‘me’ that I however place as a beyond only within discourse, and 
because me as well as this sentence is within materiality, within that reality beyond, this placing so takes 
part in the process of materialization. Haraway (2008) conceptualize this entanglement of matter and 
discourse, and see to a complex construction of meaning and lived reality through this involvement 
through material-semiotic nodes such as my body. Inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s ([1945]2012) 
explanation that perception must be of materiality, thus that materiality inevitably is part of experience, 
in my weave I do not assume a view that what I experience are representations, but I assume that I do 
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experience materiality, hence that materiality is in some sense primary even in human experience. 
However my interpretation and mediation of this experience into knowledge, is inevitably altered by 
understanding’s secondary premises of conceptualization, so this experience is always inseparably 
entangled with what is discursive interpretations, that in turn affect materiality. I so agree with Butler 
that our knowledge of materiality can never be pre-discursive and that this knowledge necessarily takes 
part in formatting materiality. All we can ever know about matter is that is exceeds representation, and 
that such an understanding of an ‘outside’ discourse is, because it is discursively dependent, only a 
dissimulated perception of an outside (Butler [1993]2011; Kirby 2002). But the fact that we cannot 
understand matter does not mean that matter does not format the experience, interpretation and action of 
humans, that we do not perceive it (Kirby 2002). Our experience is so intricately involved with both 
materiality and our own reflecting practice of it – and that experience and the practices that it results in, 
is part of the world, takes part in the materiality that consist us. And so I will neither leave materiality, 
discourse or subjectivity be, but see to what is happening with the ontology of experience if we 
interrogate exactly the entanglement, the relationality of these three (perceived) ‘elements’ (where 
perception is also part). 
Weaving 
I have proposed that the main purpose of the thesis is to formulate what I call my weave of 
understanding, so as to apply my specific understanding to understand something, but that the potential 
application is not the body of the thesis but the outcome of it. This has implications that makes this 
thesis necessarily a bit untraditional also in its structure. Firstly, theory is my material of investigation. 
A description of the theory I use will be presented in the forthcoming part where I localize previous 
research and present what I locate as three different streams of notions from where I collect certain 
notions from certain authors. However, the theory as material is what will be presented in the main body 
of this text. This so mean that theory is not really applied in this thesis, at least not on anything other 
than theory itself. Instead I engage in the theory that is my material through a method, that I through this 
specific method use the entanglement of these theories, what I soon will describe as the resonance of 
them, to actually understand them – understand them in them self but only through the resonance of 
their simultaneous resound. This entangled understanding will be understood as a method through two 
metaphors explained below, followed by an account of my method to form that understanding. My 
weave of understanding is so rather a method of doing in it self, a process that is creational and that 
implies that I do not actually use theories, but I use the intertwined composition of these 
theories/notions, that is formulated though this very engagement with them. I need to describe two 
methods, the method of reading and the method of crafting the weave, or perhaps rather how to 
understand the weave of understanding. This weave is specific in that it consists of different parts, 
different threads, that within this specific understanding, through being intricately put together, like 
nodes, so becomes dependent on each other, affecting one another in to something inseparable no more. 
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These notions in their separate state are not the same as when they are affectedly connected, entangeled 
into this weave – they are now transforming and indeterminately in becoming through this 
interdependence that is my understanding. To understand the crafting, the doing and the notion of this 
weave and my weaving I am inspired by two different metaphors, Hanna Arendt’s weave and Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s formulation of polyphony.   
  Arendt ([1958]1998) understand the world as it appears to us as a space of appearance, where 
our lives and actions break into a history that was there before I was born, that space of appearance takes 
place as my experience. She uses the metaphor of a weave of relations and describes how individual life 
stories become indeterminate when they are nodded together like treads in a weave, when appearing into 
history. Arendt’s weave inspires the metaphor of weaving notions into a weave of understanding. Her 
weave of relations and specific constellations that through the weaving are unpredictable are translatable 
in to the becoming of my understanding, where notions are in an ever dependent and sensitive state. One 
notion here infringe as the threading of a new thread, into my historical weave of notions and alters the 
composition, the story of all these notions. – The weave, the understanding, is a dependency-process. 
The weaving of my understanding needs to be unpredictable, paradoxically because it is dependent, 
notions of theories intra-actively read through each other, and because of this interdependency of its 
parts, the unpredicatblity of it is so what sustains it, it is always only in a present temporary state. 
However that state might last for a while, but it is always potentially formatable to whatever direction it 
might take, what new notions get’s involved, at the same time always affected by the involvement of its 
parts – it is an evolvement not linear but cloak-like, a wall hanging knotted from below, telling a story 
that can never be finished, because it is told in a circle – it all needs to be there to fill and refill each 
other with meanings, in a endless potential, potentially endless. What Arendt describes as the condition 
of our action as well as our life, is this unpredictability – the excitement of life itself when it is given to 
us, is sustained through that we are stuck in a story which’s end we cannot know - I realize becomes an 
image for the drive of my weaving of understanding, its endless and ever affected and so transformed 
but dependent state makes its very potential to be unpredictability as well as endlessness (Arendt 
[1958]1998). I will never finish what I started, but I am in an ever process of unfolding and infolding. 
Arendt’s metaphor of a weave that inspires my understanding of how my specific theoretical 
understanding takes form as a weave through my weaving of threads that become affectively dependent 
and transformed in this weave as a hole, but that is nevertheless undetermined, needs to be understood 
exactly as an understanding more than a directive, because I do not weave through the clear directions of 
a proper knot-making, the tying is rather an entangling that is ‘happening’ through encounters with 
theory.  
  The image of my understanding becomes even more vivid if a sonic dimension is added. I find it 
inspiring as well as useful to pose that my weave of understanding works like Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
([2002]2010) metaphorical formulation of polyphony, where the notions that form my understanding 
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work separately as tones in themselves, but that when simultaneously sounding together form something 
more than merely the sum of the tones – a resonance. Bakhtin uses the metaphor of polyphony to 
describe the theoretical and the artistic impact of Dostoyevsky’s literary work. Bakhtin pose that the 
heroes in Dostoyevsky’s novels plead separate and independent philosophical voices, not simply the 
object of the authors own word, that are diverse and contradicting each other but that together, as a 
diversity consist a polyphony. This contributes to a philosophical resonance where different voices are 
non-closed but confound to an ever dialogue that constitutes a wholeness dependent on the diversity of 
separate voices. Bakhtin suggest that Dostoevsky so poses that there is no meaning in itself to enclosed 
statements of philosophical truth – they gather meaning only as part of a resonance that is never 
enclosed but in an ever process, however these separate and contradicting voices are utterly necessary to 
form that dialogue. Important for my own use of theory is Bakhtin’s suggestion that to grasp the 
resonance that the tones, equally ´true´ and working separately, perhaps seemingly unfitting, 
nevertheless confound into a whole - a resonance - we need to rid the elevation of monolog that 
canonical views on theory often subscribe to. If we view the world from a monological point of view 
(with theories as enclosed systems), the polyphonic construction will seem chaotic, and the notions 
incompatible. Bakhtin suggest that we need to understand Dostoyevsky’s polyphony as an artistic 
method to view the world, and perceive its diversity as organic and seamless instead of incompatible. 
We need to think the world as dialogical, not systematical, and what appears as enclosed systems, such 
as specific theories, are in fact dependent and owning meaning only through being part of a dialogical 
process. Bakhtin understands through Dostoyevsky, that thinking - the human consciousness - is 
existing through being unfinishable. This is how I would like to conceive theory, a conception that also 
legitimates my practice. I need to understand my weave as polyphonic, while it is important to 
understand the separate notions that I use for my weave as self-containing in their own world. The 
weave is so the resonance of these notions that work separately, but in my weave of understanding, they 
resonate as a different sense than when they stand by them selves as individual tones, and they resonate 
as this specific something, only when put together as compounding, dialogically constituting each other. 
I also manage to motivate my entangling of notions that work separately in specific theories through 
Bakhtin’s formulation of how the voices of Dostojevsky’s heroes are not objectified as subordinate or 
dependent on the voice of the author, instead I see the notions from different theories that I extract and 
entangle as subjects in themselves, able also to work when put into another constellation (Bakhtin 
[2002]2010). 
My method of reading the theory that forms my weave of understanding is made through a form of close 
reading inspired by Sedgwick’s (2003) thoughts on paranoid and reparative reading. Inspired by 
“interdigitating” a paranoid reading of theory with a reparative one, in way so that they are inseparable, 
I will not point out contradictions, ambiguities and gaps as weaknesses in the theory, but instead see 
those ambiguities as gateways of possibilities to spin an own transgressive theoretical web. However my 
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method is merely inspired by Sedgwick, and because I feel the word “reparative” indicates that there is 
something to “repair” in the text that I interpret and owe my understanding to, I would instead like to 
coin my method as “Sympathetic reading”. This sympathetic reading means that I will pick from, 
subjectively interpret and entangle the theory I read, constructing something else by these interpreted 
parts, trying to transgress. A sympathetic reading is open with that my interpretation/translation of the 
theory that I read is always subjective and for my specific view constructive. The specificity of my view 
and so interpretation consists of a collection of theoretical notions that I in this view have entangled, that 
as described with the metaphors of weave and polyphony above, become specific exactly when they are 
interpreted through each other.  
Research review: Theoretical field of research 
The subject of investigation in this thesis is a comprehension of theory and its object is to with it form a 
way to understand things in the world. In so my challenge is to formulate something entangled in a 
comprehensive way, but still as entangled. I am resilient to properly position my theoretical weave of 
understanding because it is produced through an entangling practice that makes the knots in it hard to 
separate, the tying or entangling being what holds it together as a weave. Additionally I am engaged in a 
mindful distortion of notions through this very entangling practice of interpreting theory, making me 
relate to theoretical concepts rather than adopting them fully. This makes it hard to distinguish the 
notions apart from my own distortion or interpretation of them into a clear field of research. 
Additionally, the field of my research is so vast that to cover it in a adequate way is not an option: as 
mentioned, I attend to speak of the relational premise of subjectivity, discourse and materiality, the 
ontology of me, as a consciousness, being in the world. However I can locate the notions that I use to 
build my weave of understanding of these concepts, as part of a feminist poststructuralist, postcolonial 
and posthumanist stream of thought. These notions in turn needs to be epistemologically located in both 
material and theoretical history. I will here outline what is relevant for my understanding in 
contemporary theoretical fields of poststructuralism, postcolonialsm and posthumanism wherein I can 
locate the concepts of materiality, subjectivity and discourse as well as locate these concepts in a history 
of philosophy of experience/being/metaphysics/epistemology. In this outline of a theoretical field about 
>being> I will present the notions that fund the western tradition of modern and post-modern philosophy 
of experience that the theorists and notions that I use to weave my understanding builds upon. I here 
attempt to relate the notions that my thesis build on, and in so partly present them in their historical 
context, as well as presenting that historical ground. I will start with how these notions is presented by 
the critical theory of the Frankfurt school, that was a political and theoretical critical reaction against the 
ideals of modernity and enlightenment, in which theoretical project also poststructuralist, postcolonial 
and posthumanist theory is sprung. 
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Modernity and critical theory 
The Frankfurt school consisted of foremost Adorno, Marcuse, Horkheimer and Habermas that in the 
1930’s developed the version of neo-Marxism called critical theory. Critical theory “facilitate a 
constructive engagement with the social world that starts from the presumption that existing 
arrangements – including currently affirmed identities and differences – do not exhaust the range of 
possibilities. It seeks to explore the ways in which our categories of thought reduce our freedom by 
occluding recognition of what could be” (Calhun 1995: xiv). In the specificity of between world war I 
and II and post world war II the Frankfurt school grew out of intertwining Hegel, psychoanalysis, 
German idealist philosophy and theology, Nietzsche and the nascent discipline of sociology with 
revisions of Marx’s original theory. The distinctive project of critical theory was to combine what had 
been traditionally abstract and universal philosophy with historical concrete and empirical knowledge of 
the social world (Agger 1998: 78; Calhun 1995:14), a mission that can very well be seen within the 
feminist project. Two crucial elements of critical theory’s reformulation of the Marxist theory was a 
critique of positivism as a result of enlightenments dialectics and assumptions about freedom, and the 
function of popular culture as an industry of ideological manipulation. Both elements comes from the 
neo-Marxist understanding of ideology functioning as an instrument in society that is materially 
conditioned, where for example class consciousness and material conditions exist in a dialectical 
feedback relationship. In critical theory’s Hegelian reading of Marx, it is such a dialectical relation that 
constitutes the synthesis of being, and human consciousness is negotiated through a historical process of 
unfolding or becoming. This advocates a view of the human will and action as contingent to, however 
free within, the framework of certain societal and cultural constraints that is not definite, thus that it is 
neither under any premise of determination nor freedom. The aim of critical theory is to unravel and 
demystify ideological dominance, and how it takes its form and so is confirmed through the experience 
and practices of individuals. Ideology and domination is persuasive and internalized, somehow 
materialized by the subject, through that society is viewed as immutable and naturelike. This theoretical 
context that was awakened in a historical context where hegemonic ideologies like Nazism, imperialism 
and capitalism had grew, from as a severe critique and resistance of it, and the project of demystifying 
ideology and dominance, as reified and legitimized through society and culture, into materiality (Agger 
1998), is where I can locate origin as well as project of the theoretical context of posthumanism, 
postcolonialism and posthumanism. The idea that the discursive claims works ideology into the relations 
of my being, my idea of myself, as if natural and inert, especially when so confirmed by my practices, is 
also part of what I will both build upon and question, or rather complex, in my weaving. Critical theory 
explains how dominant ideology such as capitalism takes part in forming my self-consciousness and my 
every day practices through defining me in the world, and so I become a supporting instrument of 
hegemony’s reification and legitimization as true and inert through settling into this dominant structure 
trough my own actions. Here Foucault’s theory of power/knowledge and the disciplining of the subject 
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finds its grounds. Even if not coming to the same conclusions, this focus on the individual itself as 
partaking in meaning, sociality, and materiality is inspirational for my project in this text, where it is 
exactly the role of me in the world, the premise of this existence, that is the subject.  
  The loss of epistemological certainty or ‘crisis of representation’ that the Frankfurt school posed 
through its assertion that representations in culture are intricately involved with ideology (Agger 1998: 
78-83), is one of the main onsets of the theoretical understandings that my thesis builds upon. The idea 
motivates the poststructuralist exercise in deconstructing these normative representations with the 
mission to reveal the ideological presumptions that is hidden in the discursive fabric that directs our 
being in the world. In my understanding however the impossibility to reflect upon the world away from 
understandings secondary conceptualizing premise, that is discourse, suggest that it is also impossible to 
be beyond such dependency to discourse and thus ideology. The disruption of one ideology that 
organizes discursive meaning will always be replaced with another. We cannot be without norms and we 
cannot locate the place beyond them – it is our own attempt to understand that construct these discursive 
norms. Thus whatever we locate beyond will be a product of this very same constructive (in)capability 
to find actuality. These discursive realms are an inevitable premise of my own composition of being, 
and they are productive for my existence, however they are not real, and so they are possible to 
deconstruct, as to disrupt violent and opressive norms that can reside with them. But because discursive 
realms are a premise of my understanding, I cannot escape their affect on my life. However, in my 
understanding representation, the object of deconstruction, is not materialized into reality since it cannot 
in itself withhold a meaning that can direct my being. Because I suggest both my dependency to and 
inescapability from discursive representation, and its impossibleness to in itself be anything, my own 
project is to investigate what might be constructively happening in the very relation between these 
impossibilities, through them as a relationality.  
My theoretical context 
I will now briefly present the theoretical fields wherein I can locate my understanding of the theoretical 
notions of materiality, subjectivity and discourse that has sprung from critical theory, and that I will then 
situate in a historical philosophical context to locate as well as explicate my understanding of the 
ontological premises of my being in relation to this history of ideas. This is my theoretical context: 
  In the 1950’s Frantz Fanon ([1952]2008) takes part in establishing the postcolonial tradition and 
describes how the black colonized subject is determined to relate itself to the white colonizer, 
inescapably defined through the relation of impossibly trying to enact whiteness. This is the condemned 
postcolonial situation, the lingering of colonization – it is inerasable from history, and so inerasable 
from me and you. But the task to enact whiteness is impossible and so contra productive because the 
colour of the skin of you is forever implying a symbolic meaning that has nothing to do with any other 
characteristics of you, but that nevertheless creates a separation just because of that demarcation of 
colour. In the black subjects case the consequence of the symbolic demarcation that ones colour inflict is 
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the destiny to always be defined in the relation to a whiteness that can also never conceptualize the 
fullness of your being but reduces it only to that relation. Fanon postulate that the specificity and 
dependence of the subjects being so make the colonialized subjects being never fully into the knowledge 
of the white man. In so the colonialized subject is never adequately defined, but nevertheless the 
specificity that fully defines that being can never be released from the infliction of the relation to 
whiteness. Addressed with postcolonial theory is the dependency of a dichotomous >same>/>other> 
distinction that claim and so produces difference through a relating where the the >other> of the >same> 
is lessened, partly to establish the own way of life a universally given, as to also legitimize 
marginalization of that >Other> that benefits the >Same> (Freire [1970]1996; hooks [1992]2015). 
  Postcolonial thought present the weight of the dependency of specificities of being and relations 
in the world to both historical, material, cultural and discursive context. Explained through that the 
world ‘post’ colonialism is not past colonialism at all, in fact colonialism has defined the situation of all 
present phenomena. Nations that are previous colonies heavily suffers the consequences of having their 
history violently disrupted and inseparably defined instead through colonialism’s surgery, effects that 
resound in these context’s partaking in the world. Equally the present state of oppressor states of 
colonialism, as well as the transnational political, economical, cultural and social power relations and 
structures of the world is inseparable as an entangled consequence of a history of colonization (Mohanty 
2003; Spivak 1999). Specificity of context in time and space is also a result of that that the meaning of a 
symbol in one context is intricately discursively formed through its relation to other symbolic meanings 
in that very context, making adequate understanding from one context to another impossible (Mahmood 
2001). The fact of meanings specificity and so difference has been eroded with the master narratives of 
western enlightenment and positivism, presenting the western (masculine) symbolic order as universal 
and objective. Herein lies also, through a Foucauldian understanding, a massive critique of a hegemonic 
western knowledge production that define what knowledge is, how it is performed thus who performs it 
– through so also legitimating and maintaining those power structures (Mohanty 2003).  
  The feminist movement of women of colour in the US explained that their experience of being 
women was specific in that they were black women. With this insight the feminist postcolonial weight 
on specificity of context denounce universalist claims of sisterhood or a universal experience of being 
woman or any other discursive category. These are leading notes to the intersectional insight that 
categories within power are intricately weaved together, maintaining each other in the specificity of 
subjects that embody not one of such claimed categories but many, creating an utter specificity of 
position within power. Intersectionality as a concept involves how discursive subject-positions and so 
subjects are inseparably involved with and so part of the workings of power-relations, dependent upon a 
poststructuralist Foucauldian explanation of how discursive claims of what existence is, dependent upon 
conceptual categorization, forces individuals to relate to and so subject them selves somehow as subjects 
to those positions (Mohanty 2003; de los Reyes & Mulinari [2005]2007). 
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Poststructuralist theory is a tradition evolved from mainly the insights of Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, 
Barthes and Levi-Strausse around the 1960:s and 70:s that builds on but at the same time critique and 
transform the structuralist tradition. Poststructuralist thought adopt the structuralist idea that frameworks 
of society, such as language and institutions, structure our being in it, but overthrow the idea that there 
would be an essential meaning that makes these structures stable. With Foucault ([1972]2010, [1976] 
2002) poststructuralism so tend not to the quest of finding universal patterns, but instead see to the 
changeability of what is perceived as inevitable, why things are found inevitable in a certain time and 
space and how this come to change and differ given context. With Foucault ([1976]2002; 1980) this is 
explained through the relation of power/knowledge - a relation of claimed and reified knowing. This 
knowing is structured through discourses that make the individual act in certain ways through claiming 
its desire and being as defined in the realms of that discourse, enabling that subject as a subject only if it 
confesses it self in that form, and so confirming that discursive claim. Through that subjects self-
understand only in relation to discourse, discourses claim to define and represent the subject enables its 
constructive being through delimiting the possibilities of what such a self might be. With this insight 
poststructuralist thought focus on the way that we dependently relate to these structures, to understand 
and so construct our selves and so form our actions in the world, but at the same time changing these 
frameworks that we relate to, because they have no essence or core to make them stay put - they are 
dependently constructed through our relating. With the perception of them as true we performatively 
make them somewhat true, we enact them into stability while inevitably also pressing on and disrupting 
them (Butler [1990]2007; [1993]2011; [2004]2006). In the Foucauldian understanding of 
power/knowledge, discourse involves also the manner in which this mediating/talking about things in a 
certain time and space is enacted, and so manifested as if true, into the materiality of our experience, 
and is structured as a structuring instance into science, architecture, medicine, law and all institutions of 
society – appearing inevitable, and making that society somewhat function and the individuals in it 
somewhat functioning in it together (Foucault 1980).  
  Perhaps most important of all, poststructuralist theory informs us with the insight that there is no 
pre-discursive knowledge (Butler [1990]2007). Any truth or materiality, any objective directing our 
material state is unreachable to us because the secondary conceptual premises of understanding that 
dilutes our knowing as contingent to a contextual historical system of conceptualisation. The 
incommensurability of knowledge to represent a real world (Kant [1781]1998) and the specificity of 
discourse has highly influenced feminist epistemology to claim the unavoidable subjectivity and 
impossibility of objectivity that premises knowledge as situated within a specific context as well as to a 
specific individual, and that the situatedness of my knowledge-production must be recognized as 
involved in that knowledge (Haraway 1991). Poststructural theory uses Derrida ([1967]2016, 
[1972]1982) to understand the secondary, however constructive premises of language. Concepts such as 
words are quite devious because they claim to, in their very nature, do what they cannot do – to reflect 
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the world as it is. This is an impossible claim because to structure thought the human mind perform 
conceptualization. – Thus my understanding will always be of things that are not concepts – as concepts. 
I inevitably create something (concepts) that is existing only in my conception, not in the nature that it 
tries to speak of. The contradiction here is that Derrida so suggest that while words have no inherent 
meaning, but that it is taking place in the relation between these signs, thus that the sign is arbitrary and 
transforming, meaning in its mediated or knowledgeable form can only be created through this very 
secondary conceptualizing practice. Meanings relational dependency is according to Derrida built 
around binary oppositions such as man/woman, nature/culture that through this dependency-relation 
attributes each parties of the dichotomy meaning only in vulnerable relation to the other party. The 
capacity to mean something in my understanding is ascribed to material phenomena through that they 
function as symbols that meaning so can be attached to. Luce Irigaray (1980, [1983]1993) takes the 
body of the woman as an example. I understand through Irigaray that the uterus is part of my material 
body, but has become a symbol of meaning that so ascribes other meanings to it. As a symbol the 
meaning of my uterus is so arbitrary and indeterminate, but my uterus will still remain a symbol that 
generally demarcates me in to the symbolic category Woman, that so differates me from the symbolic 
category of the Man, no matter what meaning that has temporally been ascribed to either my uterus or 
the category of Woman (only in relation to man and vice versa). What creates difference between man 
and woman as those signs is thus not any inherent characteristics of the woman nor the man, because 
those ascribed characteristics will vary in time and space, but the demarcation of my body as a symbol 
(Braidotti 2002). What is encircled with poststructuralism is a world that cannot be encircled; an ever 
transformative, fluid and undetermined state of entanglement. 
If poststructuralist theory features a critique of enlightenments ideal of the free subject, derived from 
enlightenment, humanisms unproclaimed however consistent grounds in universalism and essentialism 
structured by objectivist and positivist ideals, posthumanism critiques the very concept of the human as 
built up on the false dichotomies of nature/culture, human/animal or machine and states that those ideals 
are already convicted by human life interacting with both nature and technology in an inseparable way 
(Haraway 1991, 2008; Braidotti 2002; Wilson 2008). Posthumanism ca be situated in both 
poststructuralist and postcolonial notions however critiquing poststructuralism as being tangled up in a 
separation between materiality and idea that puts language as primary, because materiality as a maker of 
meaning is left be through the conclusion that we cannot know anything about it beyond language and 
discourse secondary premise – leaving deconstruction of concepts the only interesting object of analysis 
(Kirby 2002). Posthumanism puts matter back in to matter, so to speak. This is inspired partly from 
Latour’s clarification of how human conceptualization has ordered the world in to separate disciplines 
that are only in human conception structured as so. In real life, matter is not fragmentally separated but 
entangled, and human life and experience is part of that entanglement. This makes the dichotomous 
concept of nature and culture, as well as separation of materiality in to disciplines and concepts, 
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hopelessly and paradoxically dependent only to human conceptualization it self – thus my inability to 
understand the world (Latour [1991]1993; Barad 2007). However this inability is constructively 
affecting our interaction in the world, manifesting exactly how we are part of its materiality. 
Posthumanist theory disrupt the Cartesian separation between body and mind/soul as well as 
nature/culture and claim that so needs all scientific (social and natural) research. The chemical signals 
and bodily functions of our body and mind situate our experience in an inseparable way from our action 
and so construction of the world and even of discourse. For example my affect takes part in structuring 
the world, as an entangled meeting of bodily functions and symbolic and discursive workings. My body 
– its functions, abilities or non abilities, and my sense of it highly affects my experience and my 
interpretation of the world, and so my partaking in it. However my interpretation of these bodily sensing 
can neither be separated from the symbolic inscription of meaning on it, my relation to this meaning 
also possibly inflicting me to subvert or change my bodily being. – The meaning of my body is so not 
only indeterminate in a symbolic sense but also in its very materiality; these workings are quite 
inseparable. Instead of the fragmental sense of the world offered by conceptual thinking, posthumanism 
see to the connectivity of all phenomena in the world. Inspired by Deleuze, Rosi Braidotti (2002) 
suggest the posthuman as a nomadic subjectivity, that if we think about, we already embody. Together 
with Donna Haraway (1991), Braidotti sets the ground for a nomadic subjectivity that sees to that we are 
dependent and constituted through that dependency. Our position is specific in time and space, and our 
actions so affect in undetermined ways, this dependency and connectivity of phenomena, also makes us 
see the concept ‘human’ as either totally indeterminate or as an already dated concept – there are no 
limits between our skin and the rest of the world. As Haraway (1991, 2008) suggests, we are already 
cyborgs in that our bodies are totally entangled and dependent with things and devices that we 
nevertheless have defined as outside us. Actually, without tools, without things that we have created 
technologies around and so are dependent on, the >human> is not at all. And these devises that extends 
me, likewise are extended into me. As my agency and definition expands with this involvement, so do I 
become more and more dependent, connected - and those material things, has their way with me.  
Location within history 
My thesis is situated in and builds upon what I interpret as feminist theory that asks questions about the 
being of experience, or that involves it self in some way with the relation between discourse-subjectivity 
and materiality. My involved notions of this kind of ontological questions needs to be situated in its 
relation to a theoretical and philosophical history where these notions has been discussed. This history 
has enabled further complications in contemporary theory regarding the premises of our being, where 
feminist theory has often made intersectional practices and categories such as gender, sexuality, race and 
class its object. In my interest of the beings (or non-being) of subjectivity intersectional analysis has 
additionally functioned as examples of lived life where ontological questions might be tested. Feminist 
theory is forceful in this way because it has the ability to confound theory, even philosophy with a 
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practiced reality or experience of reality. In my view, if philosophy is to be of the world it needs to show 
it self in my world. I would like to state that a motivation of this thesis is that I believe in my 
understandings because I feel to experience them. My understanding now is a result of, dependent on, 
historical processes of theory - both in being able to build on and argue against the theory and 
discussions that historically situate my on view. The feminist theoretical context outlined above, that I 
weave my understanding from, spring from the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, and the notions 
that these theoretical contexts derive from I locate are the philosophical contributions of Kant, Hegel, 
Nietzsche and Marx. In the groundbreaking discussions of this western philosophical canon, I find my 
theoretical context and understanding relating in different constructive ways, interpreting, adopting, 
transforming and contradicting. In the following outline of the historical situatedness of my 
understanding in a philosophy of experience, reality and idea – the history of ideas that my theoretical 
context builds on - I will see to the different notions in this historical theoretical context in which I can 
locate my own understanding of the relation of discourse, subjectivity and materiality, even if entangled 
and revised. With this outline I find ways to situate the notions of poststructuralism, postcolonialism and 
posthumanism in relation to these understanding, as well as to scavenge their historical theoretical 
entanglement in a way that is constructive of my own understanding. The canon and the philosophical 
notions I will now present is what I can locate as the tradition that my thesis come from, because it is 
what the postcolonial, poststructuralist and posthumanist theorists I use to understand situate their 
thinking in, in so illustrating the very predicament of the postcolonial position, when its theory cannot 
escape a western canon that its notions are inescapably historically situated in and so formed by. 
Both the source of immense influence and critique, as grounding of western philosophy are the notions 
of René Descartes, who in 17’th century France, through doubting all knowledge find one singular 
principle leading away from the conclusion that there is only doubt: The existence of him self as a 
thinker of that very thought, and being able to doubt it – his thinking existence premising also that 
doubt. However he points out that he knows only that what exist is this thinking thinker, perhaps that 
singular one – in its strictest sense. Descartes builds upon Plato’s founding thought from ca 1500 years 
earlier, that there is one world of experience, the one that we perceive with our senses that is in change, 
and where shapes vary, and one world of ideas consisting of forms that are constant, and that we can 
only reach with our intellect. The world of ideas thus remains materially inexperienced, while the world 
of experience is not the real world, and the shapes in it that we perceive are merely shadows of the 
stable forms of the world of ideas – thus humans and knowledge can never perceive the world as it is. 
The possibility that our experience is not fully representative of the world, and thus that there are 
limitations to our knowledge, has formed western philosophy and created the concept of epistemology, 
and it is also this thought that Descartes further explicate. Human knowledge is based on the experience 
of that existence and we cannot know of its existence apart from that experience (Russell [1946]2004; 
Atkinson et al 2011). This initial idea about the state of human knowledge is crucial to the poststructural 
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as well as posthumanist stream of thought, while severely critiquing other parts of the Cartesian 
tradition, for example the posthumanist critique of his splitting of me into body and mind (Colebrook 
2008).  
Immanent to the enlightenment period in the 1800’th century and founder of critical philosophy, 
Immanuel Kant ([1781]1998) separate the human from the world through the very notion of the world. 
Because I have a notion of the world, that notion is necessarily not a representation of that world in itself 
but separate from it. My reflection upon the world is ever a representation of something represented, 
inflicting an inevitable separation that also separates me to express to others as well as experiencing my 
self only within the representational sphere of human mind (that what I will call understanding). This 
human conception of the world can so never be a direct experience of the world in itself – because it 
requires the secondary premises of reflection. In so, also our knowledge about the world in it self is 
always under secondary premises. According to Kant material substance, things in themselves, does 
exist, but can never become pre-conceptually experienced by the human mind – it is only represented as 
a representation in human experience. Kant suggest that there are concepts or categories that are a priori 
- that is to say, universally given - that structures human understanding and experience and that enables 
our reasoning about the world. This ‘reason’ is the autonomy of law, what makes law possible (what I 
will understand as my beings capability), laws that are so not external (like God), but constructed by 
humans through their reasoning capability/practice, and enabled through the framework of concepts that 
makes ‘things in them selves’, that is; material things, the represented, intelligible to our world of ideas 
as representations. Kant so separates the world from human experience where we are in intuitive 
contact with material things in time and space, but our reasoning, our understanding of these things are 
situated and dependent upon our (in)ability to have an indirect knowledge of them only through 
understanding them as concepts or categories so that we can reason about them. Inherent in this notion is 
Kant’s persuasive suggestion that human understanding of materiality consists a framework of concepts, 
that so puts human experience as always someway apart form that materiality/reality through that the 
understanding premise of our consciousness needs to place that thing in itself in to the framework of 
concepts, as a representation of it, that is to say to dislocate it as of, not in it self (Russell [1946]2004; 
Colebrook 2005; Atkinson et al 2011). What Kant suggest about the incommensurability of human 
knowledge about a material world, that creates a dislocation or a diffusion of human experience is 
essential for a poststructuralist as well as a posthumanist and postcolonial understanding. The notion 
that seeming laws are constructed through the human act of making experience intelligible rather than 
from that experience of materiality itself, what is interpreted as natural and true dependent on 
conceptualizations that are inevitably not proper reflections of the material world, but existing only in 
human mediation of knowledge, is essentially the ground concept of a Foucaudian understanding of 
discourse. However, this poststructuralist concept is also what proves that concepts are not, as Kant 
suggest, universally given, a priori, but the reasoning’s around them, thus their meaning, are changing 
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throughout a historical context.  
  Kant establish that there is in fact a material world in that the possibility to measure my ever 
changing, temporal now lies only in the relation to material objects that is not inflicted by the that same 
now. This relation of now in a specific time and space to something else, that defines that existence, also 
assume specificity of site to that existence that has influenced my theoretical context (Russell 
[1946]2004; Atkinson et al 2011). Thus Kant presuppose the poststructuralist and postcolonial point that 
our experience and so knowledge-making of the world is made from a specific point of view. For Kant 
however, the weight of site-specificity regards to the metaphysical proposition of that the implications 
of experience as a point of view effect to a non-immediacy of representation. Kant’s view suggest that 
our experience - our conceived knowledge of the world – that in so is disconnected from that material 
world, is a world in its own sense that so is primary, because it is separate form materiality, thus not 
given in it self to us, and thus rather subject for the human minds creation, even if these creating 
structures are not changeable, not determined by any external force. In this understanding, I >have> a 
world through certain conditions of understanding (Colebrook 2005). The poststructuralist and 
posthumanist understanding contradict the supposition of freedom and autonomy of the human 
reasoning – here the human is understood as merely separated from the world in the very mediating 
system of representation and reasoning in itself, that experience is dependent on however not exclusive 
to. In my understanding, human experience is not actually separated from the world, it merely cannot 
conceptualize it in a adequate way. But that understanding as a practice in itself takes part in experience 
and materiality occupies poststructuralism in some of its core missions: What are the specific grounds to 
the logic that we actually live by, and that structures itself through structure, discourse, semiotics or 
culture that are all effects of a representational system, hence not given, in the world (Colebrook 2005)? 
The inseparable involvement of conceptual understanding with materiality grounds Butler’s 
([1990]2007) principal that there is no pre-discursive sense of our experience. This understanding is 
often interpreted as suggesting that through our practices, understanding become material and motivate 
the poststructuralist quest to deconstruct these categories as secondary, however in a Butlarian view still 
pointing to the impossibility to ever gain pre-discursive/pre-categorical knowledge of the material 
world, often leaving the very thought of materiality be because of its inaccessibility in knowledge’s 
discursive nature. Posthumanist theorists point to that not attending to materiality’s affect on experience 
and being, just because we cannot understand it in a pre-discursive way, is nevertheless to practically 
put the secondary premise of human understanding as primary (Kirby 2002). My weaving throughout 
the thesis, will expand on this critique, through involving the very Kantian grounds that has motivated 
the notion of discourse as constructive – that discourse is a product of our own attempt to understand 
and create value. Crucial for my own understanding is that the inevitable dislocation from, and 
unintelligibility of, experienced materiality through conceptual understanding of that experience that 
disables any pre-discursive knowledge, does not actually postulate that human experience and idea is 
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separated from the material world, only that through my experience, (my) materiality is ever involved 
and impossibly separated also with these secondary terms. Actually, on the contrary to a 
poststructuralist assumption of discourse, in this thesis I will, trough proceeding from a poststructuralist 
notion of my dependency and inseparability to discourse, try to grasp how discursive idea does not 
construct our world - how it merely affect, is constructive, in an entangled, relational way.  
  With a posthumanist and poststucturalist understanding the interpretation/knowledge is not, as 
was suggested by Kant, merely done of the world when put into conceptualization, thus separating that 
understanding from that world it is to understand, but is undeniably also made in the world, taking part 
in it. My experience is material but cannot be represented as such when representation are under the 
secondary condition of reflection (as that of a distanced objective). There is no actual void between 
experience (as if only interpreted materiality) and matter. The fact that we are part of the world is, if we 
use Kant with a posthumanist analysis, shown precisely through that our observation (or reflection) of 
the world to make it knowledgeable, affects the world that we try to observe (Barad 2007). This 
posthumanist understanding of the undetermined involvement or inseparability of the subject in matter 
and vice versa is crucial for my understanding, corresponding also with a Foucauldian understanding of 
knowledge. The reflection (knowledge) can impossibly reflect itself and so count that reflective process 
as part of the world that it interprets, but it is part of the world. But inherent in this understanding is the 
metaphysical burden of that any reflection of experience (knowledge) infer a separation of that object of 
experience (represented) from the knowledge about it (representation).  
  With these notions I find my understanding and theoretical context is situated with Kant, also 
through overhauling some of his conclusions: Firstly, my own view that even if human experience 
cannot be made intelligible outside the secondary, conceptualizing premise of reflection, it might merely 
be the mediation of experience, not our wholly experience that is secondary – we might actually, in an 
involved way, as I will expand on, experience matter partly as it is, however we can not understand this 
outside conceptualization, that so also involves itself with our being. Secondly, the notion that not only 
is experience bound to understandings distanced premise, but separated from the material world. Thus 
thirdly, that there are no external laws of human experience apart from reasons own power to create 
them, and that this imply humans to own a freedom to determinate their own being. And the crucial 
fourth, Kant’s assumption of that categories that structure the world of ideas/representation and makes 
experience knowledgeable however under a secondary premise in relation to materiality, are ‘a priori’, 
given and stable (thus assuming an essence to our being that legitimate its current state). This is an 
assumption which critique needs to be situated with Hegel about a half decade later. 
Hegel ([1807]2001) derives from Kant’s crucial insights but revise the categorical frameworks of ideas 
as not static but specific in time and space. The conceptual framework for experience that Kant 
suggested Hegel now suggest is not a priori but always in a changing state. Hegel propose a notion 
where ideas that structure our experience in a specific time are formed through relations of dependence 
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of antagonist ideas creating a reasoning where these parts conditions each others existence, sort of claim 
one another into being, but only through this very relation - a dialectic – the sum of which is in fact only 
this dependency. This dialectic is popularly explained as: thesis - antithesis = synthesis and with Hegel 
this is formulated as that one ideas >being> calls on and is dependent on its >non-being>, together 
constituting a dialectical movement of an ever >becoming>. Here is a devious being of reality always 
dislocated into yet another synthesis and so never grasped as a stable form, nor as the >things> it claims 
to understand, because the experience is consisting of the temporal dialectics of idea in time and space 
constituted through the relation between the opposite polarities of a discussion that depend on each 
other, existing only in this discussion - that relation the temporary syntax of being (Russell [1946]2004; 
Mouffe [2005]2008; Atkinson et al 2011; Butler 2005, 2015). These premises of idea grounds 
Foucault’s principle of knowledge and discourse as contextual and in ever change. 
  Hegel poses the being of now as a historical process. The notion of that the specificities of 
now in time and space is intricately dependent to the historical context that preceded that now, is one of 
the grounding notions of postcolonial, as poststructural, theory, suggesting that history is constructing 
the specificities of situations in such an extent that it is ever present in also constructing our future. - 
The consequences of a colonial past is intricately entangled into the forming of present life (Spivak 
1990). In my theoretical context and own understanding all that is >I> is dependent on history, however 
there is no linearity nor determinism to this >I>. The Hegelian dialectic is so crucial for my weave of 
understanding in that it supposes relationality as the very genesis of being and determines that being as 
dependent, but that dependency precisely suggesting an ever indetermination of being (even if Hegel 
himself assumes that this process is a strive for an ultimate absolution (Atkinson et al 2011)). An 
absolute freedom is in my view both impossible and overestimated: I exist only in relation. Without the 
supposed limit of another person to relate to I am not. Hegel’s dialectics explaining the dependency of 
the genesis of >something> only in relation to >something> else that is so also claimed into being, is the 
basis of Butler and Foucault’s understanding of how the subject comes to be only as a response to what 
so appears outside >it> (Butler 2005; 2015). Hegel not only suggest the oppositional dependence of a 
>self>/>Other> construction/distinction, that nevertheless constitute the exact opposite of that suggested 
separation – because they so enable each other, existing through that relation, but he also suggest the 
process of becoming through this dialectical process of only relating, that inspires my own and 
posthumanist theory. The incommensurability of claimed opponents into actuality, I will in my 
understanding pose as paradoxically constructive.  
Yet another half decade later, in the later 19’th century, Nietzsche ([1883-1891]2010) poses the idea that 
throughout history western philosophy has presupposed and tangled together higher values regarding 
humanity, God and moral. These values are held as given and legitimate each other through their 
entangled state. As does human life - when we suppose them as given and true we so maintain and enact 
them as such. Nietzsche find this notion through disrupting the idea of a separation between a 
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perceivable or a phenomenal world and the real material world. He poses that if we cannot in any way 
access the world in it self, is it not unnecessary or uninteresting to pose it as existing at all? And with 
that question he sees that it is this separation that has enabled and legitimated the entangled master 
narratives through that they do not speak of the material world that so can be felt and proven, but that 
they are located in an idea world beyond touch, where such worth is idealized and thus untouchable, 
actually through that it has no stable ground that can prove or disprove it. These higher values cannot be 
disproved because they have been put beyond the human – by the human itself. So, these ideological 
master narratives maintain each other in to a sort of reason that actually structures peoples experience 
and even practices in the world, making the ideological narratives/reasoning’s true in some sense (Butler 
2005; Russell [1946]2004; Atkinson et al 2011). This manner of turning tables (values does not 
correspond to a human nature but humans action correspond to values that state themselves as such) 
makes Nietzsche central for critical theory’s notion of ideology and for Foucauldian understanding. 
However unlike Nietzsche, Foucault does not suppose that there is a possibility to be free of the almost 
self-fulfilling prophecy of discourse - as that of a productive limitation. With my weave of 
understanding I also intend to question its actual fulfillability.  
From these philosophical engagements in the relation between materiality and idea, the secondary 
premises of experience and inaccessibility of human knowledge outlined, is the idea of temporary 
reasoning’s that structure human thoughts and so involvement with the world. But for idea to become 
materiality, for my understanding to recognize the material dependence of a becoming state, and abstract 
philosophies of experience to speak of my life, I need Marx. Building upon Hegel and Nietzsche, Marx 
explains a supporting relation of dependency between materiality and idea/discourse where the 
individual takes part in the formation of materiality from a materially situated experience, following 
what he calls ideology. Poststructuralist understanding so uses Marx to understand the materialization of 
discourse. Marx describe such an idea that structure experience in dialectic processes as the figure of 
capitalist economy. The basic Marxist theoretical framework suggest the involvement of idea/ideology, 
subject and materiality in a speaking way, where the rationality of capital is linked to human 
relationships that has become intricately involved with commodity culture, where commodities are 
fetishized and involved with those very relations, constituting the workings of ideology that reifies 
existing relationships and stalls social change. Ideology that confirms existent capitalist structures here 
works through that these relations profit through human relationships that through these very processes 
of ideology is mystified and so experienced as natural hence as legit and stable (Marx (1868)2015; 
Agger 1998; Balibar/Wallerstein [1997]2002; Laclau 1977).  
  My thesis is dependent upon the assumption of some sort of creativity (not as a concept 
premised by the often masculine concepts of progress or free will) as an inherent part of the human 
condition, what I will refer to as desire/constructivity/subjectivity/creativity. I refer to a creativity 
derived from desire or the search for pleasure (perhaps of creativity in itself) where desire and pleasure 
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are specific to the position and specificity of a certain being, intricately dependent, entangled and 
complexed in that specificity. This is an assumption that needs to be located in the materialist key 
feature of production and reproduction of requirements of life as the premise of human existence, and 
where I as a subject enter this creativity of production, that defines me as a person in relation to the 
world, from a certain material condition that also defines my means to create (Agger 1998; Colebrook 
2008). I see that a Marxist understanding is crucial for a both postcolonial and posthumanist perspective 
in that it suggest that materiality’s support of the human body and life take part in creating experience’s 
specificity of position as well as acknowledges that also our experience takes part in the world. 
Posthumanism points to that material circumstances directs and support being, and that while a pre-
discursive knowledge of materiality is impossible, discourse and language is also within materiality, as 
well as that the specificity of my being and so my interpretation of the world is supported and dependent 
by material conditions, my desire and needs contingent to these circumstances (Kirby 2002; Braidotti 
2002; Wilson 2008). Through enabling a situating of material life in to concepts of philosophy, Marx 
enhances the role of my actual being in the making of ideology into matter.  
Discussion - The relationality through which I become 
Disposition of the discussion 
My task in this discussion is to guide you to an understanding about the relation between discourse, 
subjectivity and materiality that I have come to through an interest in feminist theory about the potential 
beings of subjectivity, and through reading notions from different theorists concerning subjectivity, 
discourse and materiality through each other, thus where I have understood theory in an inseparably 
entangled manner. The rhizomatic tendency to my understanding, has the consequence that I will 
construct a rendition of the weaving process as the form of a spiral where I am constantly fetching 
notions that I have once, twice, several times touched upon, that through this fetching where I read the 
notions simultaneously through one another, will continuously become understood. The weaving here 
happens through that I am fetching threads from previous nodes and attach them to new nodes. To 
become a weave, knots needs to consist out of more than one thread. The nodes presented needs to be 
understood through the other nodes of the weave to be fully understood or validated as that what the 
weave present. My aspiration is that when the weave is fully in vision, you will be able to understand 
also the separate nodes in it, through seeing it as a whole. The chapters will be introducing concepts or 
themes as if presenting to you separate nodes in my weave of understanding, but the chapter will 
actually present not one node but several, in an intertwined way. In a weave nodes are not separate but 
inseparably connected, interwoven into that weave. In the themes of theory I will present ‘findings’ that 
works as steps in the text that guide the sequence of theoretical threading. The notions and divergences 
presented in the separate themes directs my intertwining of them with other theoretical notions. I will 
continuously use gender and/or sexuality and at times also racial identity to give examples of the 
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situation or condition I try to explain/understand. This has a demonstrating effect of how this 
understanding could be used when analyzing diverse phenomena regarding subjectivity.  
  Imagine the initial state of weaving. The weave needs a set of ground nodes to enable further 
weaving on to those nodes. In the course of my weaving I have found my understanding of how the 
relation of discourse, subjectivity and materiality might explain my being in the world, to continuously 
involve it self with two obstacles presented in a understanding of Butler and Foucault that is my point of 
departure. I will read these obstacles through other theories and so form a new understanding. 
The discourse/subjectivity dialecticality and the question of change in it 
It is not so strange after all, the human’s desire to understand it self in the world. That struggle as a 
desire and attempt – and the practices of that struggle – is the practiced idea of subjectivity. I will 
suggest that the subject’s desire to understand it self in the world ends up in something completely 
different from what is attempted, but that results in the subject’s actual manifestation in the world, as 
part of it, in any way that such a subject could take place. Subjectivity is a practice but, I will suggest, 
not a practice upon which I have ever properly reflected. Because the idea of being a subject in the 
world, the strive to understand one self as the self experienced, is dependent on a being within 
understanding - that is within discourse. The paradox of impossibility that I see amounts to something 
constructive offered by this understanding of subjectivity is a corner node in the relationality of 
discourse-subjectivity-materiality that I will, through my weaving, suggest, to understand being. 
Through working within this relationality I (will) suggest subjectivity as a strive of impossible success, 
but the practices of that strive to construct a manifestation of that subjectivity in the world, that is 
beyond understanding, as a practice taking place as part of the world, affecting and changing it. 
My own theoretical engagement has been evolving around this project, to understand being, mine and 
others, in the world. What is experience, what premises my experience, and what premises difference in 
experience? Feminist theory is extensively productive for this attempt to understand, revolving around 
experience, subjectivity and the subject as part of the world. My engagement in theories of subjectivity 
or subjection is entered from understandings derived from reading Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, 
suggesting subjectivity and discourse to be intricately dialectical. This dialectical dependency-relation of 
discourse and subjectivity is so my point of departure for weaving it into notions and questions that 
entangles this relation further, into something else. At the same time, with this very engagement, I 
disengage from some assumptions that has generally been the outcome from a Foucauldian and 
Butlarian departure, and protest some of those assumptions. This defiance is not made from a critique of 
Butler and Foucault, but is rather enabled through them, through committing to and entangling some 
questions that are in this Foucauldian and Butlarian engagement evoked, into my weave. In other words, 
these questions and readings that able my weaving are dependent on a Foucauldian and Butlarian 
understanding, however entangling these understandings into something else from what might generally 
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be assumed as such an understanding. In this first part of the discussion I will both further introduce the 
relation between discourse and subjectivity as explained by Butler and Foucault, building onto the 
explanation initiated in the introduction, as well as to introduce mentioned questions and contradictions 
that I have found in this suggested relation, enabling a further complication of it. These two main 
obstacles, will throughout the text be discussed, through that I weave theoretical notions into each other 
with the help of these obstacles, and through that weave find a way to respond to them. 
The discursive enablement of the subject – an understandable being 
Here, I will so introduce what I call the discourse/subjectivity-dialecticality; as how I read Foucault and 
Butler to present discourse and subjectivity to constitute one another in a enabling dependency-relation. 
Foucault has explained the workings of power/knowledge as operative through discourses effects in 
society. Actually, with Foucault what is power cannot be separated from discourse as engaging 
knowledge into the production of being, engaging all that is defined with that knowledge - and so in 
some sense enabled - into power, including the subject. Discourses reciprocate, confirm each other as 
‘true’ and in specific historical contexts they form a sort of logic in ideas that so appear to be separated 
and thus owning a stable core or essence that legitimizes them. But in dependently confirming each 
other, these discursive claims are intertwined in the fluid and netlike function of power. Foucault 
explains how throughout history, the temporary and contextually conditioned knowledge about madness 
as well as sexuality is constantly intertwined with knowledge about other concepts and with institutions, 
with science, law, politics, culture, religion, and moral, and reciprocate with contextual economic, social 
and political needs (Foucault [1976]2002, [1972]2010, 1980). Foucault as well as Butler explains how 
in it self this relational function that enables understanding as well as an organizing of sociality, its 
material structures, and the bodies in its relation to each other - likewise those bodies understanding of 
themselves in the world, of them selves as >selves>, as subjects, and thus what these bodies actual 
partaking in the world looks like – is necessary for individuals to be understandable to each other and to 
function as a sociality. This functionality constitutes the relation power/knowledge with Foucault.  
  Through claiming the being of different subjectivities as representations, discourse enable both 
the relating to those claims - constituting the performative practices of subjectivity that also manifest 
subjectivity as a partaking in the world - as well as the idea of subjectivity as the substantial existence of 
>the subject> as an entity in the world, that is to say, the individual within understanding. With both 
Butler (1997, 2005) and Foucault ([1976]2002) this constitutional relation to discourse is what can be 
defined as subjection – the enabling of the subject through subjecting to limiting claims that claim to 
define you and so makes you intelligible within understanding. Understanding is paradoxically though, 
as suggested by Kant, dependent on discourse and representations secondary premise. If subjectivity is a 
self-reflecting practice or at least attempt, it is dependent upon discourses secondary premises of 
knowledge/understanding, to attempt at that self-understanding. Discourse’s claims are assertions to 
adequately represent subjects, to define them, and it is unavoidably in relation to those claims that 
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subjectivity as a self-reflection is enabled. The subject is so claimed by discourse that claims it self to by 
its very nature do what it by default cannot do – represent reality as concepts of understanding – because 
these concepts are through this very conceptualizing being/practice doing something with the reality that 
it claims to represent, that cannot be inherent in what it claims to represent; it sorts it in to concepts that 
is only the premise of understanding, not of experience. That is, the representation of what is claimed to 
be represented is made in a secondary causality (Kant [1781]1998; Derrida [1967]2016,[1972]1982). 
But the subject is through being claimed by discourse that can impossibly represent being and 
experience in an adequate manner, in some sense also claimed into being – because in relation to those 
claims to what understanding and so self-reflection is dependent, the individual is also able to relate it 
self as a >self> (Foucault [1976]2002, 2008; Butler 1997, 2005). As I will come back to, this relating is 
made in diverse manners, but always and dependently in relation to discursive claims that makes being 
intelligible at all. Through its dependency to discursive claims about it, the >self> that is so enabled, 
confirms discourse as operative, while at the same time discourse is dependent always upon that 
confirmation, creating a sensitive situation of dialectically bending to one another and so constituting 
each other within that relation – however, not as a particular stable form. As I understand and will 
explain it, actually not in a particular form at all, but rather as enabled. Foucault and Butler explains also 
that trough conceptually defining life into human understanding discourse does not only enable that life 
as understandable and make available intelligible subject-position for individual experience to relate and 
create an intelligible self as well as practices in relation to, but it is suspending other ways of living from 
understanding, it is delimiting existence in discourse, and through the social structuring of discourse, 
also in different ways delimiting existence with discourse. Through that they are not discursively 
endorsed as intelligible, or seen as not leading a desirable life, some bodies does not own the rights of 
existence, are not defined in the realms of >humanness>, or are in discourse pathologized into insecurity 
of existence when they suffer repression from sociality as well as laws, structures and institutions that 
has the means of making life endurable but that only acknowledge lives through discourses realms 
(Butler [1993]2011; Barker 1998). At the same time that understanding is ever within change through 
the very same enabled or unabled >subject’s> relation to it, that means that those limits are always 
potentially movable. This dependency-relation of discourse/subjectivity is how both Foucault and Butler 
encapsulates subjection as a Janus faced phenomena through what the subject and its possibilities is both 
enabled and restricted. The discourse/subjectivity- relation that is concluded in the subjecting practice 
that constitute >The subject> within understanding, within discourse – because to be an intelligibly 
acknowledged subject we need to subject to the concepts that makes understanding possible at all – is so 
necessary for a being within understanding. Through these inclusive functions that enable 
understandable being - that are so, if anything, functional through constructing something organizable - 
a constant and constantly transforming truth-making is taking place. This is functional and constructive 
through the engagement and so the constructivity of all of what is claimed in it, however this 
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engagement conditions what is claimed in an always sensitive, dependent and so transformable state. 
Within these relations where subjectivity, organizing norms, legit law and agreements are enabled, 
discourses’ temporary claims are through the paradoxical enablement of >understanding> that discourse 
entails, legitimized as knowledge, so taking part in constructing societal structures and cultural 
practices, in turn partaking in refigurating materiality, reciprocating discourses claims with that 
refiguration. Power is so a force that is constructive through restricting, that enables being through 
claiming it in a defining and so delimiting principal. In this limiting practice lies the possibilities of 
being for the intelligebled subject. 
  Although Foucault expands and complicates the concept of power to be a both restrictive and 
productive relational and thus including force, he does not reject official power or executive bodies of 
power, but suggests that also these are part of the relationships of power/knowledge, legitimized and 
transformed through that discursive claims are both somehow materialized through their operations and 
also sensitive for the transformativity that discourses dependency with subjectivity and bodily practices 
entails. These official power organs needs to be legitimized through subjecting, (self)disciplining 
bodies, and these bodies so take part in forming also these organs though their relating to what is 
discursively claimed. However it is also partly through those relational and functional networks that 
these bodies are changing. In so, Foucault explains how in the modern (and late-modern society) 
sovereign power over death has been replaced by an arrangement of bodies and a management of life it 
self, legitimized, operative and inclusive through that we are affirmed as managing, that is, as 
manageable by the relations that through that representational affirmation also restricts us, and where 
this pervading power where we ourselves are included as operating cells, is further tied and set up in 
regulatory institutions such as legal systems but also science – that claims to talk about us, confirmed by 
our own cooperation that is caused by the privileges of discursive acknowledgement that also delimit 
our ways. These premises of bio-power and power/knowledge - inclusive, restrictive and sensitive, and 
fully operative through that sensitivity - explains the occurrence of appeared certainties and functioning 
norms in different contexts (Foucault [1976]2002, 1980). 
  Foucault so explains the operative instances of power/knowledge that works from the individual 
act and sense of self to a macro-level, wherein the subject is both enabled and repressed through that 
discourse acknowledge life it self into understanding – enabling subjectivity as a self-reflecting act, 
through presenting, acknowledging, defining and thus restricting (understandable) being. Discourse so 
define the concepts of knowledge, as if constructions built upon reality, representing that reality. 
Paradoxically though the very purpose of these constructions is to be doing what cannot be done – 
conceptualize reality in a reflective way. If I see these constructions not as built upon the world though, 
but as in the world, what do they do with the world? And if I see that they are unable to represent, could 
they really be considered actual constructions of something? What does that claim do in the world, even 
if it is not fulfillable? The process of meeting these questions will be to explain the relationality of me.  
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  Butler adopts the Foucauldian dialectics of discourse and subjectivity enabling as well as 
restricting one another as constituting operators of power. However, evolving a hybrid between Foucault 
and a historical materialist position of how the subject’s experience (and so performance) is provided by 
contextual circumstances, Butler complicates deeper into explaining the premise of the very experience 
and thus practices of the subject (as a >subject>), as constituted within this relation of discourse and 
subjectivity. The practices of myself in relation to discursive claims is how I am constructively taking 
part in the world, in some way materializing discourse through those relating practices where I attempt 
to perform the discursive claims and representations as if they were representing me, as if true, and thus 
I am enabled to enact my >self> as >true> within discourse, within understanding. These are the 
performative practices trough which the discursive >subject> actually is manifested materially in the 
world. However the citation of discursive claims that claim to define the subject, and so enable it into 
understanding and within the rights that an intelligible subject own, that is performativity, is merely a 
stylized and repeated act that makes discursive claims appear truthful, and in turn the individual 
performing in relation to them appear truthful, intelligible (Butler [1990]2007, [1993]2011, 
[2004]2006). With Butler so discourse and subjectivity are dialectically confirming each others 
appeared truth, discourse constructing both my experiences and the material structures that supports me 
through that I am performatively relating to it. With Butler, all that we speak of thus understand, is 
always and inevitably within discourse and so can never be held to own a truth or essence that is pre-
discursive. All of human action and thus partaking in and constructing of the world, is thus made from a 
discursive perspective, hence things that are material, such as genitals, is inevitably interpreted from 
discursive systems of understanding. Likewise material engagements in the world, such as sexual 
behavior is made in relation to discourse and so cannot be understood or analyzed as apart from 
discourse (Butler [1990]2007; 2015). Thus with Butler, subjectivity can never be beyond discourse, 
because materiality can never be beyond discourse in our understanding, and in any way that we partake 
in the world, performing >subjects> as subjectivities are always only understood with discourse that so 
partake in constructing our further relations with materiality, so also affecting materiality into something 
inseparable from discourses affect. In Butler’s theory the very workings of subjectivity as a discourse-
affect is put into focus as a constructive force in the world. Subjectivity is made from an interpretation 
from a specificity that can never be understood beyond discourse, and that through the subject’s 
performative dependence to that understanding, that specificity is further constructed by that 
performance in relation to discourse. The subject’s discursively bound constitution as a self thus affects 
the world in a creational manner. 
Disrupting the circle  
From these readings of Butler and Foucault as presenting discourse and subjectivity as dialectically 
constituted I will now proceed to suggest that this notion has often been red into the assumption of a 
circled constitution of being but that to me introduces a contradiction that makes me consider and 
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propose a different reading of what the discourse/subjectivity-dialecticality might actually suggest about 
being in the world. In a Foucauldian understanding of power as relations that terms us all to be that 
power, it is through spotlighting the relational function that moves into experience and being, I find 
threads to my weaving. What is said about >being> through the explanation of the workings of 
discourse as organizing society and relations? What is here suggested as premises of experience or lived 
life? Paradoxically, with Foucault and Butler, I will talk about what is not merely discursive, however 
what discourse involves itself in. I here find a threshold into a different reading that enables my weaving 
of the relationality discourse-subjectivity-materiality. The notions of Foucault and Butler that I have so 
far presented in the discussion has often resulted in the supposition of a causality of >discourse - 
enabling subjectivity – performing discourse into matter – confirming discourse>. Assumed here is that 
discourse and representation is enacted and thus performed into being and experience. This circular 
causality I find is often taken for granted in a poststructuralist or postmodern reading, resulting in 
deconstruction as the only relevant task, implicating a supposition where discourse and representation 
almost unnoticeably and undiscussed become equated with experience. This is not to suggest that this is 
a stated or even reflected conclusion, exactly because the premises of discourse is of course not the 
object of investigation in much research. It is rather a result of that within the disciplines of humanities 
discourse-analysis and deconstruction has become the paradigmatic method of investigation. If merely 
adopted, there is a tendency to also support a postulation that it is meaningless to speak of anything 
except discourse since understanding cannot be pre-discursive (a notion in itself that I agree with), but 
that ends up in a perhaps unreflected suggestion that representation somehow is the experienced world. 
Paradoxically here, through investigating only the falsity and secondariness of discourse, discourse is 
put as primary. In my view, deconstruction and discourse-analysis is analysing experience in part, and I 
acknowledge the crucial necessity of its critique, to able different discourses and to disrupt others. 
However, deconstruction deconstruct discourse and representation that takes part in constructing 
experience, it deconstruct understanding and sometimes understandings possible affects - not the full 
complexity of experience in it self. As I understand it, as I will come to – the two are not the same thing, 
however they are inseparably involved with each other. Whereas we inevitably need to se to how the 
inaccessibility of anything pre-discursive into understanding also partakes as those premises, and how 
discursive claims involves itself with experience and being, I will explain why it is these relations that 
must be considered rather than the appeared entities in them.  
  My threshold of possible entanglements through which I evolve my weaving from Foucault and 
Butler is trough subverting from the general assumption explained above, that has often followed from 
readings of Foucault and Butlers discourse/subjectivity- dialecticality, and instead engaging in the 
complications entailed in the very discourse/subjectivity-dialecticality if that assumption of 
materialization of discourse is complicated. Foucault and Butler explain with the discourse/ subjectivity-
dialecticality presented, that subjects are claimed into being through discourse – so dependent to such 
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claims to relate a >self> to, only in that relation creating that >self>. However, I find that this relating 
practice does not entail materialization – merely a dependency to >something> to relate to, to create one 
self as >something>, in this relating practice constructing things. With this reading I introduce my 
weaving of an understanding of the being of the subject in the world through this suggestion given what 
we have so far come to, to further entangle: The subject is constituted through a claim, as well as a 
confession as if inhabiting that claim, as claimable, that affects into a practice that manifest subjectivity 
as a partaking in the world, that is so enabled and at the same time restricted by discursive claims, but 
those claims are secondary and inadequate, never representing nor materialized – they are functioning 
only in the relationality of our relating to them, they are noting in them selves. In my reading Foucault 
and Butler present discourse as never materialized, never in a direct contact with matter and creating 
that matter as something, as if discourse was something in it self, but merely affective in a relationality. 
- I will concentrate on the possible details of the process, that this reading offers. In other words I resist 
assuming a social constructivist paradigm as well as resist to ignore what is not discursive merely 
because our knowledge cannot be pre-discursively representative.  
  Under the two following paragraphs I will present two problems that become clear to me from 
this perhaps somewhat alternative/altering reading of Butler and Foucault, when I again look at what is 
suggested about the relation of discourse, subjectivity and materiality and how my being in the world 
might be premised, given these notions. 
The question of change within the discourse/subjectivity-dialecticality    
Foucault ([1972]2002, [1976]2010) persuade the dialectically constituting dependency relation that is 
discourse/subjectivity, or power/knowledge, to be true through engaging in historical genealogies and 
archaeologies, where it is shown that what is perceived to be the meaning of different concepts such as 
madness or sexuality, what is perceived as the human condition, the truth about us, changes – that 
discourse changes in different historical contexts, thus that our performative actions in relation to those 
discursive claims of us (claiming to define us), that is the disciplined enactment of our selves as 
discursively understandable – changes. In turn affecting to material change that confirm that discourse 
into a truth-regime. The changeability of discursive concepts likewise proof that there is no inherent 
meaning in them, but that meaning is established only in relation to concepts/claims/signifiers that 
merely works as claimers of meaning. Foucault so effectively demonstrate that discourse change. That 
change of meaning and truth take place so proves this insecurity of meaning and concepts: the 
discourse/subjectivity - dialecticality (and/or the power/knowledge dependency). Foucault here 
contributes to the confutation of the common sense perception that concepts represent things as they are 
in the world through our knowledge and language (a perception that is not so strange after all, when to 
represent reality so that we can talk about it is the very sole purpose of words, even if the philosophical 
disproval of this ability has been going on for ages), or that a representation of truth in human 
understanding would ever be possible. With Foucault and Butler, as we already have come to, in this 
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appearing ‘truth’, the premises of understanding, already entangled in discursive systems of meaning, 
are always involved. Thus no pre-discursive origin is ever intelligible or accessible for our reading of 
the world, our practices can never be said to exist outside of discourses influence and neither can the 
interpretations and so affects of those practices be. That Foucault proves change in ‘truth’, proves the 
very discourse/subjectivity-dialecticality, but here emerges my problem. Because in the circular 
causality that is seemingly suggested by the subjectivity/ discourse-dialecticality described above, 
discursive claims would be materialized through subjection and the subject’s performative acts and 
citation of those claims, thus supporting those very same discursive claims into consistency. In this 
circular arrangement, my question must be: How does change occur? The discourse that forms the 
subject, is dependent on the subject’s materialization of that very discourse (or materialization in some 
sense). In her recent book Butler (2015) addresses the relation of the performed subject and materiality 
in discussing Hannah Arendt who suggest that the agency of subjects in coalition creates and 
reconfigure materiality and space. Butler argues this as simplifying since the subject and its 
performative, creative practices that produce space - because its existence relies on interdependency 
with a sociality - needs material support to come into the being and agency that construct that 
materiality. Butler affirm not only subject’s interdependency of each other, but also the dialectal 
interdependency of the subject’s performative action, creating and changing material circumstances - 
with that materiality that support the subject into being. Hence the subject’s actions are created from 
those material circumstances that it also affect, recreate and reconfigure. Butler and Foucault so seems 
to rest on a formula of the relation of discourse – subjectivity and materiality that take place from each 
part to the other, with neither origin nor direction but total dependency. Discourse enable forms of 
subjectivity that takes part in materiality, subjectivity takes part in forming the materiality it is also 
formed by. Herein, assuming that there is no pre-discursive essence or determination that direct the 
discursive change that has proven the discourse/subjectvitity (or power/knowledge)-dialecticalty, an 
oxymoron of why and how change occur, to me appears. If discourse direct and maintain the subject that 
equally direct and maintain discourse, does this not actually suggest a status quo? Also difference, that 
should work as changer of things because different discourses (that are always normalizing or 
normative) change each other and because difference disproves discourses >truths> forcing discourse to 
fit to difference, and so to change, is not premised in the discourse/subjectivity-dialecticality, other than 
that if such difference already somehow existed in discourse itself, as if owning and directing its own 
meaning. The discourse/subjectivity dialecticality when so interpreted effectively explains why there are 
subjection in the form of disciplining to existing norms. But if there is no essence that determine our 
being, how come there is subversion, difference from these norms? If norms and representations control 
our will and actions how come there are difference from those representations and norms that affects 
them to change? The discourse/subjectivity-dialecticality suggested by Foucault and Butler, if read as 
circularly fulfilling, and if the premises of this formula is not paid attention to, suggest a circle of 
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constitution that is proven by the occurrence of change but where change, as well as difference, in it self 
does not seem to be premised, but rather prevented. However change of and certainly difference from 
discursive claims, is taking place continuously, unstoppably. To solve this dilemma I suggest we look at 
the very equation and read it differently, and that we look at the very conditions that has suggested 
discourse to be constructive in the first place. What does my being imply for my own possibilities, or 
rather, what does my being in the world imply for the possibilities of my partaking in it? If discourse 
constitute the possibilities of the subject that so constitute discourse through performatively taking part 
in materiality – in some sense materializing discourses claims, and there is no essence manifested in 
discourse to direct being, change must be built into this very relation as a condition, which is why I want 
to look more carefully in that relation. 
The origin-dilemma  
In the loss of change in the circular causality of discourse-subjectivity-materiality-discourse, attaches 
also an other problem concerning the possible origin of movement. The location of the origin of my act 
here seems to build upon assumptions that contradict the grounds of the idea of discourse it self, and it is 
a question that concern the premises of agency, accountability and freedom of the subject. With Butler 
([1990]2007, [1993]2011, 1997, [2004]2006, 2005) (following Foucault) the subject is dependently 
involved with discourse to such an extent that it >is< not, except from its enabled establishing of it self, 
as well as material enactment of such a self, in relation to discourse. Butler thus renders any truth of 
materiality as inevitably inaccessible within this construction. In my understanding, Butler sees to how 
we perform our selves as >selves>, always through a citation of discourse (relating), in so taking part in 
discourse through an ever failing practice of trying to fill it. >Selves> become in relation to discourse in 
terms of the individual as a subject as well as a constructor of that subjectivity and thus the discourse 
that claims it, terming experience and subjectivity as a practice (performativity) partaking in the world 
(materiality) within this relation. This sees to how the individual’s practices as well as sense of self 
partakes in operations of power from a personal and specific materiality and position that is neither ever 
beyond discursive affects. Foucault ([1976]2002; 1982) introduces the idea that power is including our 
being in a simultaneously restrictive/repressive and enabling/productive function to such an extent that 
power is always already including resistance to it. Resistance to discourse is explained as enabled 
through those very same delimiting realms of discourse, and so power’s inclusive function of 
enablement through a delimiting principal can be interpreted as leaving little room for agency that is not 
constituted through those very same realms that it resists (thus does not explain change). As I see it, this 
interpretation of what Foucault suggest presumes that discourse is somehow materialized without 
having inherent meaning, and so as discussed, presumes that there would be some kind of essential 
interpretation of discourse nevertheless, as if these realms exist as something that actually limits the 
subject in a direct way. Failure or resistance is in this understanding not merely a negation of meaning 
but it is embedded in the dominant as an alternative, and thus it works as creational force but where the 
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opportunity of such creational failure or resistance is still controlled by realms that would determine its 
possibilities. It seems here that discourse is already including all of my possible action into its realms 
and thus constituting my possibilities of movement in the world, concluding my act of subjectivity as 
always a performative enacting of discourses suggestion. I find inherent in this claim the assumption 
that discourse would actually bear meaning in it self, transferring meaning onto the subject that is thence 
materialized by the subjects performativity that confirm the discourse, thus suggesting a sort of primacy 
of discourse in this nevertheless dialectically depending relation. Butler’s concept of performativity, 
building upon Foucault, so seem to suggest that discourse actually transmit a meaning in itself that 
direct the subject’s involvement in the world, even if the very idea of discourse that Butler proceed from 
emanate exactly from the impossibility of human understanding to accurately represent meaning. Is here 
suggested a conceptual world of actual meaning that we build upon the real world - that which we 
cannot understand with understandings conceptual premise - when we try to understand and represent 
that world? Is here the subject’s secondary premised understanding not actually the subject’s own 
limited practice, to be seen as an actual realm of understanding outside that subject, as if existing 
beyond that subject in which the need for it reside? For me, that the subject and its constructive 
practices, in a Butlarian and Foucauldian understanding, seem to emerge (merely) as a result of 
discourse, surface this problem. It implicate a primacy of discourse, where the actual moving being of 
the subject it self, not only the discursively understood subject, becomes somewhat dissolved into a 
discourse-effect, and thus the discourse, context and The Other, that is suggested to constitute it, the 
only relevant object of study. To put my being merely outside my self, for me makes the actuality of my 
own experience of being part of the world, somewhat lost. I suggest that my experience of self must 
affect the world it is part of, as that experience. What are the others that constitutes sociality, if not 
senses of selves? Where could value be found, except from in my experience? And what would 
discourse be if not for that experience? In my interest of how the subject take place as an actual 
movement in the world, I need to understand that what is to be understood by the subject is materiality 
as primary to discourse, because discourse is nothing except for the subject that needs it to attempt to 
understand the world, thus that discourse cannot represent anything except from that need created from 
my material existencei. But what I also need to understand, is that this primary materiality is always 
unintelligible to me, and always affected by understanding’s discursive premise through that discourse 
as a function as part of a relationality also affects my partaking in the world. I am material, thus 
discourse is in some sense to, and it could not create meaning apart from my existence, to direct my 
existence, it could not be anything in itself. The very philosophy about discourse comes, as explained, 
from that it does not bear inherent meaning in itself, that the meaning produced is merely relational and 
changeable, and that discourse’s reason is the human’s need to understand its own experience. That this 
experience of mine so would be decided by the same discourse that was to understand that experience, 
leaves me in front of the hopeless contradiction that discourse in it self actually would be the holder of 
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meaning, an essence (because it is constructed from nowhere except in itself) outside of the human itself 
and its incapability to understand, thus suggesting stability and determinism, the same essentialism that 
the very idea of discourse proclaim to contradict. The principal that is to disrupt the assumption of 
origin and substance comes to somehow put the origin and substance in discourse itself, in a reversed 
sense of representationalism. For this contradiction not to appear, perhaps Butler’s ([1990]2007, 
[1993]2011, 1997, [2004]2006, 2005) suggestion of discourses function needs an alternate reading - it 
needs to be entangled. Because discourse is where the subject’s understanding of itself and the world is 
enabled, both our understanding of ourselves and our practises in the world thus our partaking in it, is 
with Butler always within that relation to discourse. The being of the subject cannot, I agree, ever be 
separated from discursive involvement. However, what I see that this means is that the subject emerge 
as a result of its own praxis of understanding the world. The need to understand - the cause of discourse 
- is the need of the subject, a result of a subject that is part of the world. Even if we cannot perceive 
anything prediscursive, discourse needs nevertheless to be secondary to the materiality that it claims but 
fail to represent, because discourse is a praxis, a function that involves it self, it cannot be anything, not 
any specific meaning in particular, that is transmittable to the subject itself. It cannot bear any meaning 
apart from the meaning that the subject itself makes it out to be, because understanding, the cause of 
discourses merely meaning-organizing function, is a praxis made by the subject to understand a world 
that it is already in. Thus I propose that when subjectivity cannot ever be considered pre-discursive, 
because an inseparable part of subjectivity is a constructive understanding attempt, neither can discourse 
be considered anything apart from the subject. To understand the actual constructivity of discourse 
through my performativity, I need to look at the relationality of a material and understanding subject in 
the world. That through my being these things are involved, always without any stability in themselves.  
  Even if my suggestion of a relationality is a suggestion of a dependency situation, I so argue that 
a reading of Butlers theory of subjection (1997, 2005) as implying a dissolution of the subject itself into 
utter dependency, to a discourse and alterity, an outside it that is primary to it and so constitutes it, does 
not consider the subject as a subject always already in the world – a subject that is part of the world, 
thus in utter dependency to it, but nevertheless I am in it. Both poststructuralist understanding with 
Butler and posthumanist notions dissolve the subject in an outside where the subjects being in it self 
becomes a unanswered question. Posthumanist theorists has criticized Butler for making discourse 
primary to the materiality of the subject through forgetting its material being, the body, and its 
constituted dependency also to all material, not only discursive context (Kirby 2002). But also this 
critique seems to forget a part of this subject’s being in the word: That it is the material being of the 
subject as a part of the world that the understanding practice, that creates discourse that so also always 
becomes a condition of the subject’s material being in the world, persist on, and is an inevitable 
consequence of. Thus that the understanding practice that construct discourse as a condition of meaning-
production in secondary reference to materiality so that the subject can attempt to understand it, is 
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always already a practice that is in the subject as part of the world. In this situation of my being in the 
world, these parts will never be apart. But they are the situation - as a relationalilty they are the situation 
of me in the world. This relationality of my being in the world that will dissolve and complex the 
problem of the origin of my act, rather than dissolve me, I will continue to explain.  
The secondary and inadequate condition of discourse and the constructivity of difference 
I will now introduce you to what I find are the grounding motivations for my proclamation of these two 
problems that regards the relation between discourse, subjectivity and materiality. This motivation is 
that both Butler and Foucault’s perspective on discourse’s constructive dimension, that has for many 
suggested a primary function of discourse as regulating the subject’s materialization of its claims, is 
actually reliant in the notion that discourse is a secondary practice that inadequately is representing the 
materiality it claims to represent and that so must precede it. My understanding of the grounds of 
discourses inadequate and secondary, however constructive status, what I will call ‘the understanding 
praxis’, that is my trust in that experience cannot be reduced to a discourse-effect at the same time that it 
is neither ever apart from discourses affect, will be outlined here. But I will also explain how discourse 
is nevertheless confirmed as if either representing or materialized, as well introduce thoughts on how the 
very inadequateness of discourse makes it constructive as part of a relationality. 
The perception of matter 
My being in the world is a situation where the material things that I experience, the quality of matter is 
not produced in me, however my experience of them is. Or rather, they are so also in me, I need to 
perceive them in their own quality to experience them in an other way. In other words my experience 
needs to be provided by my actual being in the world. And my experience needs to be provided, 
however not given in its form, by that world, in so I am never apart that world. “Red and green are not 
sensations, they are sensibles, and quality is not an element of consciousness, but a property of the 
object.”(Merleau-Ponty [1945]2012:27) Reading Merleau-Ponty ([1945]2012) I collect the insight that 
sensation is beneath all qualitative content, thus it precedes my perception of it. – Because that I 
perceive it is what makes me exist in the world, the world exceeds me. In lesser words: Because I 
perceive it, it exceeds me. (And under these conditions I am my self also sensible). Matter precedes the 
perception of it, a perception that is part of my experience of being, thus matter precedes my 
understanding (attempt) of experience. This makes me argue that matter is part of my experience, or 
rather that I experience it, and thus part of creating my desire and performative act, but that the 
perceived quality of it is hopelessly lost to, or obscured in an entanglement within my own production 
of experience that is my attempt to understand this very experience and materiality. The primacy of 
matter will thus be impossibly inaccessible to my own reflections about my actual achieved 
accomplishment of such a pure impression of matter, that nevertheless does need to be happening, 
because what might otherwise conclud
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attempt to understand it? That constructive attempt, that involvement of the beings of me, need to be a 
result of my being in the world. In my being in the world, thus my partaking in it, my involvement in it, 
these things will always be inseparable because all of them conditions me in the world. Even if I will 
also argue that there is no pure impression of matter in my experience, because the understanding 
attempt of it is already always in my state of perception, that is my being, the impression of the actual 
existing of matter that I am part of is the reason of the understanding attempt, thus even if I cannot 
extract the feeling of it from the rest of my conditions of being, that is my understanding praxis, I do in 
some sense, sense matter. This conditions my being as being because it is in the world, thus that my 
experience is of the world and thus in the world and so my attempt to understand the world as a result of 
my being in the world, not the world as a result of my attempt to understand it. That I cannot understand 
materiality beyond my own conditions of understanding that so involves itself with my experience and 
interpretation as well as with materiality itself (but as I will suggest impossibly in any direct manner), 
does not mean that I do not perceive matter. On the contrary, that I perceive matter is the reason that I 
attempt to understand it. The contradictive impossibility of that my experience would be constructed 
merely of my attempt to understand that experience, convinces me that my experience, however never 
separable from my own (and the world’s) understanding of it, that is also constructive of experienced 
materiality, cannot be the source of my experience, and that my experience so needs to be extensively 
more than what discourse sets me to understand it is. And don’t I feel it. 
Concept and (un-conzeptualized) matter are inseparable in experience  
Foucault and Butler brings the insight that through a delimiting principal discourse enable the subject. 
The subject is enabled as >a subject> through discourse’s claim - that is to say, the subject within 
understanding, through that it is enabled to relate it self into concepts of understanding that discursive 
claims offer. My conception of what it is to be a subject is bound to these concepts, in relation to which 
I relate and so am enabled as a self-reflection, and through this relating I also manifest in the world 
through practically partaking (performativity). In my weaving I still carry this understanding, however I 
locate that this is what happens in the inevitable understanding praxis that is not separate from my 
being, but, as I will continue to explain, is part of the condition of my being in the world, hence not the 
origin of that being, but part of its involvement. This means that even if we can never tell it like it is, 
also what is not conceptualized, hence what is not discursive – what I will refer to as materiality - 
partake in experience, construct our relating practice. In my understanding I hold on to this: Discourse 
and representation cannot represent that experience and being what they claim to refer to, however we 
are dependent to that reference, and that referencing practice takes part in experiencing to – but not in a 
direct sense. In experience these are inseparable parts, the representation and the being. An un-
discursive state can by default never be intelligible, thus we can not separate it from conceptions affect 
within experience. However what is unintelligible, un-conceptualized and thus not discursively 
restricted (materiality) – is surely not excluded from experience, hence it affects our experience, 
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practices and being – it affects into meaning. Materiality so needs to take part in forming also our 
interpretation and relating to discourse and representation, through what discourse and representation 
gain meaning, but the condition of understanding sardonically works so, that when we aim to understand 
we inevitably dislocate it all into something discursive, that is into something that is not at all that to 
what we referred – and then our experience can neither be separated from that referring practice and the 
system of connotations that it is functioning through. If I position myself in relation to a Kantian 
understanding, I realize that my view needs to be that I do not have any primary access to the meaning 
of representations, because they do not have value in them selves, apart form my own relating to them, 
thus representations cannot have a primary status of them selves in my experience. In my un-essentialist 
poststructuralist understanding of the condition of words/concept, together with a posthumanist 
conviction that materiality needs to be considered in an analysis of experience because I am part of the 
world, I, my understanding, is not its maker, this would mean that our experience does not consist of 
representation (discourse and language). Instead, experience from where we interpret representational 
meaning, an interpretation that puts the world (materiality) into understanding that so makes us act in 
certain ways in the world (performativity), as part of the world, must in some sense include a primary 
perception of materiality - materiality must be its cause. However our being is taking part in materiality 
via secondary premises of understanding, that also entangles this perceiving as inseparable from it, a 
pre-discursive materiality unknown (not unperceived) and materiality so affected also by discourse. 
  Experience is so impossibly parted into concepts, which is the way that understanding enables a 
secondary and inadequate understanding of something that actually is not existing as so, because it is the 
experience of the unconceptualized that we conceptualize. But the parting practice of understanding 
consequently also takes part in the practices I do that also affect materiality as well as my reading of my 
experiences, so my experience. This means that all things are intertwined and inseparable, however I can 
never, because I am a conscious creature, disavow anything as unaffected by any discourse. Sexuality 
for example affects my being in all parts, however the understanding of sexuality is always only an 
inadequate representation that, however affective of that >everything>/all that cannot be separated into 
concepts in a representative way. My understanding of sexuality does not represent any fixed entity of 
practices and being in life, and thus my understanding of sexuality as a concept, is inevitably dependent 
on relating to all else that is not discursively deployed to that concept - that >else> from it, also 
producing, involving itself in the concept of sexuality. It is thus unavoidable to involve my practiced 
self with the discursive understanding of the concept of sexuality, whatever relation I have to it. To 
understand my self, thus to put myself into understanding, I need to relate to all that is under the 
premises of that understanding, and so it is to relate to concepts that are inadequately representing, but 
however involving everything into themselves. This means that I am through my subjectivity, my 
practices of relating also producing things that entail discourse into something productively partaking, 
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however never materialized and never adequately representing any >thing> (because things as such does 
not exist apart from in discourse).  
Discourses claims are secondary, inadequate and impossibly materialized  
From this redemption of the materiality (primacy) of experience but that is intricately involved with 
discourses premise of conceptualization, I will now engage in explaining why performative citation of 
discourse impossibly could entail any sort of materialization of it, but that it is nevertheless constructive 
as a function within a relation. Even though I proceed from Butler and Foucault’s discourse/ subjectivity 
– dialecticality where discourse regulate the subject’s possibilities through it being bound to such 
delimitating concepts to grasp its own existence, and to be intelligible and so recognized in society, my 
understanding does not conclude what happen here as the materialization of discourse through the 
discursively enabled subject’s performative citation. On the contrary, because I understand that there is 
no substance, no value or meaning in discourse’s claims and representations >themselves>, I also need 
to understand that they could not be materialized, as little as they are capable of adequately representing 
experience or being. Discourse’s claims are nothing in them selves, they get meaning only in my 
relation to them. This relation where discourse’s meaning is happening, could never amount to anything 
other from this very relation, however discourse still affect being – through enabling this constructive 
relation, and trough that our being in the world also composes our attempt to understand it. I so merely 
accept that discourse enable through restricting the possible beings of the individual as intelligible in 
discourse, as a definable subject, an inevitable function that enables self-reflection and understanding of 
my situation of being, but that is a function not constituting my being but that is part of a relationality of 
which the subject consist. In so I accept the notion that discourse’s claims here affect materiality 
through that the subject needs to relate performatively to those claims that claims its possibilities, to 
enact it self as an intelligible subject in that same discursive sphere were we are understandable to each 
other and where we reflect upon our >selves> only in relation to what is conceptually presented as the 
being of such >selves>. What I suggest here is discourse as partaking in a relational practice where it is 
part of the world in an affective way, merely affecting through that relation, never in the form that it 
claims to affect – thus that discursive forms are never materialized, because it has no such form in itself. 
Paradoxically, if we are to talk about experience we cannot stay away from the non-discursive 
(materiality), as if it is not part of forming experience merely because we cannot understand it, cannot 
conceptualize it, without through that conceptualizing practice disrupting that original state. When I 
attempt to understand any question of what is my full, always unintelligible experience, I need to 
retrospectively place it into discourse and so enter regulation – and I have lost it always before I have 
turned it into an >it>, because the ‘it’-making is outside that state that I refer to, is a force that moves 
that reference, and dislocates it from that what is claims to refer to (Derrida [1967]2016, [1972]1982). 
My possibilities of being, my experience and actions are so never regulated merely through discourse’s 
delimiting enablement, only what is >understood>, what is acknowledged, confessed as a subjectivity, 
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is. That discursive knowledge however, complicates itself in a constructive dependency-relation to 
subjectivity, that affects materiality, inseparably taking part in being, in so much that Bulter’s statement 
that ‘there is no pre-discursive being/experience’ is still true, however in my understanding, as I will 
continuously explain, in a very complex sense, because there can neither be anything directly 
transmitted to me from what is not there apart from my relation to it, thus what I perceive, what I do can 
neither be discursive. 
Discourse does not cover experience, but affects it through a relationality  
What I have come to is that even if discourse does not cover experience nor can transmit any direct 
meaning into experience – because it is nothing in itself - it does affect it in such a way that we can still 
speak of subjectivity as dependent upon it, not only through that we are inevitably bound to it to attempt 
to understand the world, each other and our selves in it in a mediable way. The understanding and 
mediating need is always already part of me, because I was always already in the world, and not alone in 
it. Being in the world thus conditions me in an inseparability from all in that world thus my genesis 
includes the connectivity that assures my understanding and mediating praxis and so also discourses’ 
involvement in my ways of perceiving and interacting with the world, as well as the things in the world 
that I perceive. I see that I need to seize the understanding praxis and discourse as not materialized, but 
nevertheless constructive because it is always part of my being and involvement, that is it is constructive 
not in a direct sense, but in a relationality. In this part I will further explain this relational constructivity 
and also se how through this relationality that compose being in the world difference in it is assured.ii 
With Foucault (1980, [1994]1997) power is not productive for some who have it and repressive for 
others who does not, but power is powerful through setting the creational realms that are productive and 
repressive for an understandable existence as that of a recognised substance, a >subject>, altogether, 
enabling and so producing ways of existing through offering repressive limits to what that existence 
might be. The operation of those limits are the processes in which discourse is enabling indefinable 
existences in to understanding, into discourse, and so it limits that existence through discursively 
recognising it as an existence. Or rather, in my understanding, it premises that existence as always 
constructively affected by discourse in a relationality that is that same existence, as the sense/function of 
a realm, rather than restricting as that of an actual communication of value from such realms that would 
limit being (because the meaning here created inevitably needs to be made in that very same relational 
being). The substance existing only as discourse, through its delimiting principals of referring is thus 
inevitably needed for my nevertheless diverse creativity, my understanding attempt vital for my desires 
that makes me act, for my specific subjectivity, thus my production of difference. I here find myself to 
argue that the delimiting principal that Foucault suggested is actually only delimiting in my 
understanding sense, as well as that the delimiting principal is also what enables me to further create 
being and move the world, however that being and movement will always and inevitably be out of reach 
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for my understanding practice. I will experience it, but I cannot make anything beyond discourse subject 
of my desire, an object of my own conscious agency. Thus freedom is not inaccessible to me, whereas 
free will, an understanding and so conscious determination of that freedom, is out of my reach. A 
speaking example is the relatively new concept of homo - and heterosexuality. Did the formula exist 
before the formulation of it? How did people do sexual practices before these contextually existing 
definitions of them? Does these definitions properly reflect people’s sexual behaviours? In my 
understanding, as explained, sexual behaviours cannot ever be properly defined and so not understood 
and neither can people materialize those definitions in to a representing capacity, because concepts such 
as hetero and homosexuality neither have any meaning apart from our arbitrary interpretation and 
relation to them (nor from their relation to each other). In so, the Beauvoirian principal that is utterly 
expanded by Butler ([1990]2007) that gender/sex is done (through for example sexuality), needs in my 
understanding to be utterly complexed. Something is done but it is not really gender, nor a specific 
sexuality. But it is done in productive, arbitrary and thus diverse ways, dependently in relation to 
discourses claims of such conceptual existence. Even if not inherently bearing any meaning that can be 
done, representations/signs/concepts are necessary as well as constructive for me, through that they 
enable me understandable, and enable reflective practices in relation to that inadequate understanding. 
Those practices will never be understood, never properly represented, but they are constructive 
nevertheless – through their very faulty claim to represent, because they, I, am dependently made in this 
relation(ality) where discourse is part. Since my being in the world premises that being also as the 
attempt to understand it I am hopelessly confined and devoted to discourse as a function. And through 
the inseparability of that understanding attempt from the rest of my being, what I produce in that 
relation that will never be represented in discourse and that is not a materialization of discourse, is still 
dependent upon discourse. Discourses claims, as if actually claiming value, works as a threshold of my 
creativity, because what I call my subjectivity is dependent upon relating itself to it – constructing itself, 
and at the very same time as a limitation of my act, as something to create that act, into something, in 
relation to. Representation (discourse) is the way that I can self-reflect to produce desires (subjectivity) 
that so result in my performative act (my material manifestation in the world).    
  To summarize, I suggest that what affects my experience of the world; peoples conducts that I 
am affected by, social structures etc, is not a direct result of discursive claims but a relation to them as if 
owning value, and likewise my reading of those things are not merely a discourse-effect resulting in me 
performatively partaking in discursively disciplined ways, but a combination of understanding through 
discursive premises that are nevertheless dependent on my particular reading. Thus my interpretation 
and performativity is never beyond a discursive affect, but neither a direct discourse-result. Such 
directness is by default not possible since discourses amount to meaning only through my relation to it. 
Thus through the very relating to it discourse exist as >something< only as a reference point of 
representation - what I soon will explain as a demarcation of meaning - not a meaning, a >something> in 
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itself. In other words, being cannot be reduced to merely a construction in relation to what is 
discursively claimed, because that claim only gains meaning as a claim of meaning, not through bearing 
meaning, whereas that relation affect being into something inseparable from it.  
It is the subject in the world that funds change 
With these things said about the secondary premise and paradoxically non-existent content of discourse 
that nevertheless makes it constructively affective through a relationality, we are now able to return to 
the question of the occurrence of change evoked by Foucault and Butlers discourse/ subjectivity – 
dialecticality. But I have also found more recourses to address the actual being of the subject in the 
world, that I miss in a Butlarian understanding, as always already in a dependency but in a way that does 
not dissolve that subject as merely a result of what is not it.  
  Foucault explains change partly with the instability of material circumstances like economic 
structures, natural recourses or war, creating shifts that discourse bend to, so that the subjects fit the 
needs (Foucault [1972]2010, [1976]2002), and that the intertwining and dependency of different 
discourses both establishes and support discourse’s claim as true, but also makes discourses sensitive to 
change through this dependency of discourses that dialectically configure and support each other. In 
other words different discourses intra-act with each other, amounting to change within discourses. My 
case is that this sole explanation of change, entail some essence and value in discourse itself, that while 
transformable are nevertheless transmittable to the subject, directing its potential, as if a substance 
outside that subject. I have discussed that representation is unable to represent, and because it is nothing 
in it self, neither is it materializable. The potential of discourse to affect lies in my relation to it, and in 
my dependency on discourse as a point of reference of understanding, where meaning to me appear, but 
that meaning is taking place actually only in this relation where I interpret an ever unrepresented 
meaning where my desires and understandings are built, and that so amounts to my practices in the 
world, that moves that world to change. It is in my relation to discourse where my potential possibilities 
of construction lies, but that potential is thus, because discourse does not cover experience, however can 
neither be separated form it, also formed in matter that is absolutely not merely discursive. Found here is 
the possibility that it is things beyond discourse that affects to change, or rather, that the involvement of 
these things - of discourse, subjectivity, materiality - are what affects to change. Discursive meaning 
does not in itself change, because it is nothing to be changed, but the change happens through the 
relationality where discourse is part. Something other than discourse needs to be involved in discourse 
to change it, and that other is me, in the world (as what I will explain as a realtionality), not determined 
by discourse but involved in it. Actually, if discourse is not anything in itself, is without inherent 
meaning, then it would, in it self, impossibly be capable of directing me and others to a homogenous 
interpretation of it, and so change is inevitably built in to this relationality, change is not a possibility, 
but it is given through me. The meaning of discourse cannot be considered as anything in it self, but it 
works constructive for the interpretation that amounts to meaning and change through that that 
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interpretation and those constructive practices are dependent upon the claim of it to represent and thus, 
as I will come to soon, work as a realm in relation to what meaning can be arbitrarily interpreted as well 
as an organization of that meaning made. 
To engage in the question of the subject, me, as a being of my own, in regard to the lack of such a being 
of itself in Butler’s and Foucault’s theories, I have now come to the insight that discourse can 
impossibly precede that subject, thus the subject cannot be dissolved into merely result of discourse or a 
consequence of an outside from it – these things needs to be seen as conditions of a subject always in 
the world. If the subject is a reaction of discourse, subjectivity enabled as a self-reflection in relation to 
discourse, it is because discourse itself is a result of the subjects in itself actual being in the world. The 
relation of constructivity and change is necessarily taking place because of that fact that the subject is in 
the world, and needs to attempt to understand its being in it - this understanding praxis is part of the 
subject in the world – thus discourse is not outside the subject. 
  I so argue that the subject as a being always already in the world is the reason for the 
understanding praxis that creates that discourse that a reading of Butler often suggest would constitute 
this subject’s very same manifested being (performativity). The dependency of understanding and so 
discourse that is constructive of subjectivity, is caused by the subject’s itself actual material being in the 
world, and so the attempt to understand. Thus the relation to discourse, is always already part of this 
being in the world – is a product of that being: an actual material being is the reason for the 
understanding attempt, that is, for discourse. This is the subject in the world – material and attempting to 
understand its being because it was always situated in a world with others, that so premises the attempt 
to understand those others and to reflect upon one self that because of this being together is noted as a 
subject of its own, but always in relation. This means that the subject it self funds the grounds for its 
own movement in the world, but not through any grounds of adequate knowledge or accessibility to an 
essence, nor of any free will. - But through this, the relationality I have begun to explain, that 
compounds its being in the world where it is indeterminate but dependent upon a world that it is merely 
part of, and that will never be intelligible to it – but that it does affect. Understanding pertain in the 
limits of consciousness. Nothing that exist beyond my being in the world constitute that being, and that 
is so because my understanding praxis (discourses’ reason) is inherently part of this being. These 
functions that assures movement are always already in each other, because I am always already in the 
world. 
Being in the world – the relationality  
I will now more explicitly engage in presenting how the seemingly obvious and simple statement that 
my being is always in the world becomes a threshold for understanding my being as the relationality I 
suggest. What I mean is that that I am always already in the world, means that my being is always 
already consisting of a relationship between discourse, materiality and subjectivity. They assume my 
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being because they assume my being in the world. However, my being in the world composed of this 
relationality also requires me as an actual being in the world in myself. In so, these conditions 
composing my being in the world (materiality, discourse, subjectivity) needs to be looked at as 
functioning in a relationality that my being assures, and my movement of the world as made through 
these functions not as something in them selves, but always inseparably involved, as a relationality, 
affecting one another into that beings movement. 
I am the entanglement 
Sensation, my sensation of the world (matter), that comes into perception as a true objective because it is 
un-conceptualized, un-understood, thus without any claim of absolution of what it is, but merely that it 
is, and that marks itself into my experience as merely the proof of difference, thence inseparable from 
the understanding praxis’s production of the value of that difference, is also what makes materiality 
exceed and precede experience. With Merleau-Ponty ([1945]2012) I understand that my sensation is 
also what proves matter experienced. My sensation is the result of me and a sensible – of my being in 
the world. In me, what I perceive, my primary perception of what is always unintelligible, will always 
be involved with my understanding of it, through my being. But it is involved because of my being in 
the world. It is so my being in and of materiality, always perceiving materiality, that also entails my 
specific being in the world as something in itself that moves it, because this perception is what funds 
understanding, engaging my understanding practice – to understand the sensible, thus in some sense 
creating that understandable something. Being in/ experiencing matter triggers the understanding 
practice attribution of meaning to what is perceived, and it is the perception of actual difference that 
enables a distribution of such value in relation to that perceived difference, such as colours or sounds, in 
relation to one another. The demarcation of difference that enables the construction of meaning onto that 
difference, is material and free from value. However in my understanding, thus in my being, matter is 
never free from such value. In relation to these arguments, in regard to the actual being/role of the 
subject in the world, I need to understand that sensation situates understanding always as matter’s 
successor, or rather, as its merely but inevitable alleged successor. Understanding could not in itself 
build >something> apart from with this, thus nevertheless constructive, claim to do so through the 
engagement of subjectivity that this claim powers (in a relationality). A claim that is a result of my own 
being in the world. I need to argue that these things situate me in a relationality that is my being in the 
world, where these things, through the being of me, cannot be parted, but are inseparably involved 
through me, which also proves me as being in the world. And it makes the specificity of me involved, it 
makes me important, it makes me an agent – perhaps not of what can be called free will - but I am not 
merely a consequence, I have potential not determined anywhere except in the very >me in the world>. 
And the inseparability of me from the world, does not only make me dependent in it, but it makes my 
part of it highly effective, as well as me extensively responsible to it. 
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The (material) demarcation of ‘meaning’/difference in relation to what meaning is constructed 
I will now engage in the actual material reason for the enablement of discourse as partaking in a 
relationality that is constructive of being, or actually, the enablement of the understanding attempt that is 
an inherent part of the subject, and its movement, in and of the world. This is the actual difference, not 
attributed with value or meaning, but difference as a mark, that is all around us, and that makes me 
perceive my self as a self always in relation to the feeling of my body and the appearance of yours. But 
first I need to briefly engage in the organization of such demarcations, that in relation to one another in 
that organization, will appear as meaningful, however the meaning still dependent on you.  
  I am, as a subject and a body, involved in symbolic systems to collect understanding. In my 
reading of Derrida’s ([1967]2016, [1972]1982) and Irigaray’s (1980, [1983]1993) symbolic systems 
(contexts) the signs are merely demarcations that enable meaning to happen in relation to them, 
indicated into an organization of these signs through which meaning is also enabled for the subject’s 
understanding (the interpreter), through an organized relation by these signs. Meaning is here affected 
merely through a dependently involved and intra-changing order amongst those signs, that materialize in 
sociality, as a dependent system in total indetermination where understanding and meaning is enabled 
however impossibly directly mediated. I have already decided the discursive sign as nothing itself but 
constructive through a relationality where it amounts into meaning only through my relating to it. But in 
some way I still organize and understand my relating practices as if either represented by discourse or as 
materializing discourses claims. If discourse’s meaning or affect is arbitrarily decided in my relation to 
it and that relation is not directed by any essence or determination of being, how come meaning and 
discourse in certain contexts seems stable, not only through laws and structural enforcement but in my 
mediated understanding with other people? That we seem to homogenously interpret similar meaning at 
least in a certain context seems to be proven by my very ability to communicate without apparent 
misunderstandings. This seems to prove that there is in fact >something> to interpret similarly, 
something that contextual discourse is giving us that sets us up into normative behavior. However there 
are other things that might explain our confirmation of our selves as normative, because I will still 
suggest that that norm is not more than a claim of normalization, that so affects our being. Norms as 
discourse-claims are necessary frames of understanding that we manage to understand our selves as 
selves in relation to, but that understanding function merely as if representing us. As I have suggested, 
because I am always in the world, the need to reflect upon it, to understand it and me in it, is always 
within that very same me. That me is thus dependently relying upon these very same discursive 
premises of understanding that I have claimed does not adequately represent being nor is materialized. I 
argue that in the understanding praxis I confirm those claims only in that understanding that is mine, and 
that is not housing experience, but affecting it. Combined with the insights presented, my interpretation 
of Irigaray explains to me how even if discursive claims/representations are nothing in themselves, thus 
cannot be materialized, can still function as constructive, through that we confirm them as holders of 
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meaning, in so withholding them in a relationality that actually is constructive of meaning. Even though 
the claims and representations, the signs of discourse are not vehicles of meaning, they still function as 
demarcations of meaning, as if points of meaning that meaning so can be produced in reference to, but 
that does not represent a meaning in them selves. A behavior can in my understanding never actually be 
the norm (or any other concept) – it can merely be a diverse behavior that bears the material 
demarcation of difference that in the symbolic system has been ascribed normativity. Thus I will affirm 
the norm as existing merely through my behavior or through being a body bearing that material 
demarcation, whereas I could only interpret that normative representation in arbitrary and so diverse 
ways. In my understanding of Irigaray, bodies work as symbolic markers of the appeared material 
existence of discursively defined meaning (that however is ascribed different meaning throughout 
history). Bodies, through the inevitable attempt to understand and be understandable, produce 
themselves as subjects in favour of the discourse, hence making these concepts true, through ascribing 
to practices that bears the mark of a certain conceptualized difference. But the bodies also confirm 
discourse’s claim as meaningful within understanding merely through being bodies that work as 
signifiers of difference that are through discourse enabled ascription of meaning. And while that 
meaning is arbitrarily made by a body’s interpretation, amounting into performativity, the very 
demarcation of difference makes the body organisable into a symbolic system where it so is confirmed 
as actually ascribed a meaning or value in itself, confirming discourse as representing such meaning, 
and bodies as materializing it. Weaving Irigaray together with Butler and Foucault, this would be the 
only way in which a body is materializing discursive claims about it – through being functional as a 
signifier through its material parts, being those parts proving the existence of the symbol that is 
discursively ascribed meaning – thus not proving that meaning but the material existence of a symbolic 
demarcation of difference – as something understandable. Here I see that it is not so that the material is 
not affecting the discursive, but it structures it in dependency as signs with an arbitrary changeable 
meaning, that come into understanding only through secondary and inadequate discursive terms. Those 
material demarcations function as if demarcations of actual meaning, that I so relate to, to understand 
myself. 
  What I am suggesting is that the stability that me and you seem to confirm with our normative 
behaviour comes from that our reading of our diverse practices in relation to those claims, can neither be 
beyond discourse and so we within discourse, within understanding stabilize discourses claims through 
relating to them and then putting those relating practices as symbolic demarcations into discourse, 
discursively confirming as those same conceptual claims, because to understand we are bound to such 
conceptual delimitation and categorization of a being that is actually not existing as concepts and is 
presumably extensively diverse. The thus inevitable diversity of our arbitrary relating practice, from 
diverse and specific beings, remain unrepresented, and representation unmaterialized. 
  To summarize, when I weave this contradictive but effective enablement of meaning-production 
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trough demarcations of difference in a symbolic system, together with what I have previously suggested, 
I come to some understandings. Within experience what is understood into discursively defined, and 
thus arbitrarily interpreted symbolic systems of meaning are inseparably entangled with what is not 
within understanding, what is not conceptualized, thus we cannot in a knowledgeable way separate 
discourse from what is not a discourse-affect. Actually in experience discourse can never be anything 
other than a discourse-affect, because our interpretation of those representations are always also made 
from what is not definable into discourse and because discursive and representational/symbolic meaning 
is nothing in it self, and so what discursive meaning might amount to in experience is always beyond 
understanding, and potentially totally diverse. Experience must be understood as an indefinable and 
never understandable intermesh of discourse-effects and non-discursive matter transformed in 
experience. The only place where discourse’s claims might exist as definite claims are in a distanced 
representational sphere, never within experience, and in such a sphere they are without meaning, and if 
such a sphere has no meaning but exist only as a place where claims are enabled as claims, it means that 
such a sphere nevertheless exist only through our very relation to it as if there, and so in the subject’s 
very own need of it to attempt to understand itself in the world.  
I am always in the world 
What does being in the world mean? I want to explore the meaning of this picture. This situation of 
being in the world is always me. That means that I am always already born into a togetherness that I am 
never, have never been, and will not ever be, separated from, that is also I. It means that everything that 
can be located with in me, is always in the situation of also being affected by and affecting what could 
be located as outside me. It also means that the situation of a me in the world is also (part of) what the 
world consists of; that what happens in me, in my specific node of perception and in my body in the 
world. I am always the situation of being in the world, taking part in, affecting and changing, the world 
that I am in, that I am also. With my specific perception, my body, in the situation of being in the world 
(always together), I transform, do something with the specificity of me. If I am always in a togetherness 
that consists also of me, that means that all the reactions of me, all the specificities that I am and make, 
all the desires that I have and all the actions I do, is always already made in the situation of togetherness, 
that I with this specificity and constructiveness/power/changeability that I own through being a 
specificity of me, so take part in forming. If I for example feel the feeling of shame, that feeling is the 
situation of me being in the world. It is a chemical reaction in my body caused by me being in the world, 
caused by me existing together with others that make my body react, and the reaction of my body was 
always in this situation. It is a feeling that is caused not from an outside or an inside, but from a situation 
of an I always being in the world together, of an inside constituted in the involvement with an outside 
constituted by the involvements of insides. These things – discourse, subjectivity (sense of self, 
performativity) and materiality are involved because they all constitute the situation of me in the world. 
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This situation that forms that relationality, and the relationality is what will be further argued throughout 
my weaving process.  
The understanding praxis 
What I have begun to introduce is my being in the world as a concept, that what will call being as 
relationality. The conceptualization of this relationality that is me in the world needs to capture that I 
entangle my actual perception of materiality through my inevitable attempt to understand it, my 
understanding praxis, because my being is always together with others in a perception, thus my 
understanding attempt is always part of my being condition in the world. But my involvement in 
discourse (to understand) and its effects on materiality through my subjectivity also demonstrate the 
entangling specificity that my being actually is, constituting a specific being. My being is something in 
itself, a capability of unique specificity, a specific node of constructive power in the world.  
  I constitute a constructive entangling node in the world through my involving function as an 
understanding praxis. My situation always in the world demands my understanding attempt: The 
production of discourse, the value and meaning interpreted from representation etc, and the demand to 
understand myself (leading to relating, to subjectivity) comes from me being able to notice the 
difference of my actual being in the world in relation to the being of others. To continue to speak of this 
relationality of my being where my attempt to understand that being is inseparably an constructively 
part, I see that I need to clear out the concepts of this understanding in relation to materiality, discourse 
and subjectivity. To speak of this involvement of understanding generally I will use the terms 
understanding praxis, understanding attempt or discourse. As explained, demarcations of difference is 
the material manifestations onto what we are able to ascribe and organize conceptual meaning – into 
demarcations of meaning. Signs are these demarcations in matter but also words and symbols that we 
claim to own a meaning and so have subscribed to as bearers of our conceptual thinking. Demarcations 
of difference in matter are what makes us need to understand, and to make an understanding praxis and 
mediation of our experience possible, signs (words, symbols) are what we are able to organize that 
understanding and mediation around – is how we put experience/being into understanding and build 
concepts around onto which the subject’s understanding can ascribe meaning. Discourse is the 
organization of the concepts of understanding’s dependency to one another in a certain time and place. 
Discourse is a certain context of a symbolic system, that is the organization of symbols. The discursive 
claim is the claim of meaning in signs and concept as homogeneous and static that so make me create 
actual meaning around these things. But really the discursive claim is not an indication of meaning, but 
the indication or claim that meaning is within the sign, and thus the call on me to actually make such 
meaning. – It makes me create the meaning that is not there. This means that the assumed function of 
discourse to have a primary constructive function in that it mediates as the subjects knowledge and 
experience whom so performs discourse into matter - as a discursive result - thus that discourse it self 
would be transmitting some sort of meaning that can be materialized, is impossible due to the very 
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situation that has made us come to the conclusion that discourse is constructive at all – the secondary 
state of its production, its inability to represent, and thus that it impossibly can own any meaning, any 
thingness of its own to mediate. How could it be anything, if not a thing of matter itself? And because it 
is not, it can be nothing at all, except from my relation to it, thus it can be nothing but a transformation. 	  
Discourses claims are constructive through their claim to represent 
What I have explained is that if concepts are merely existing in my understanding attempt of being 
(Barad 2007), but affecting that being through that my interpretation and practices inevitably are 
involved with conceptual understanding - however inevitably in a divergent, always specific sense; these 
concepts will be heterogeneously arbitrarily interpreted, because they are nothing in them selves - then 
neither can concepts function as entities in experience, and so neither in the actual performed practices 
of beings. In other words, a certain sexuality or gender is nothing in itself and in experience it cannot be 
separated from the relation to other things experienced. But the idea that sexuality is something in it self, 
that is, our perception of concept such as sexuality, hetero, homo etc. becomes productive for our 
subjective partaking in the world. It is in this sense that discourse’s concepts are constructive only 
through a relationality, thus not in them selves. And the idea of them as representative or materialized is 
necessary for this constructive relation, meaning that discourse is constructive through its faulty claim to 
represent. In this way a person’s sexuality in a certain time and place needs to be viewed as specific and 
hopelessly interwoven and entangled with the specific circumstances it is in that time and place in. 
There is no determination, no fixity to this potentiality, because all things in experience takes part in 
each other, also that what is conceptualized as something separate, and likewise that conceptualization 
takes part in affecting these specific circumstances. My sexual practices or feelings about sexuality are 
most probably as different from a person with the same sexuality as I, as someone who is demarked as 
having another sexuality. Actually, whatever it is I am doing it is not a certain sexuality. My sexuality is 
a result of my understandings inevitable dependency to conceptual organization of demarcations of 
difference in relation to which I reflect and force my unconceptualizable and extensively complex and 
entangled experience. However this inevitable dependency of my understanding to such concepts of 
sexuality is inseparably constructive for whatever it is I am doing. The symbolic demarcation of 
difference of what is placed inside a discursive concept, has made me able to identify my self as that 
concept, making the discursive/intelligible sense of my self not differ from those who has sex with 
someone with a different cis-gender, but differing from those whom has sex with the same cis-gender or 
non-cis-genders. How these sexual practises are performed, if taking place at all, is unimportant in the 
symbolic demarcation of difference that enable the affect of discursive concept into experience.  
I am now at a place in my weave where discourse is found to not actually constitute me, but inevitably 
and constructively affecting me through a situation of being that constitutes discourse as inevitably part 
of my being. This relationality that I suggest comprise me, or I it, also ensures difference in the world, 
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because the idea of discourse as containing a medialble meaning, entailing homogenization and 
normalization of being, is disproven through that the understanding praxis inevitably must be located 
within the subject in the world, not outside it, thus the meaning of discourse will always only be an 
arbitrary interpretation from a specificity of experience that so inevitably need to be divergent, because 
the specificity is a node where matter is inseparably involved with the discourse-affect that is also 
constructive of practices and so experience and interpretation. This ensures discourse’s effect, the 
meaning interpreted and so the subject’s performativity as diverse, always different. Further I have 
understood that its is the organization of material demarcations of difference into a symbolic system of 
understanding as actual demarcations of meaning, that makes me confirm discourse as representing 
merely through being a body, being in the world, as well as what assures the actual constructive function 
of discourse, through that my attempt to understand in relation to this organization is constructive. What 
is outlined here is a very devious movement. I am in the world thus I need to attempt to understand it, 
and through the inevitable failure this assume, I construct something. 
The displacement of meaning where meaning take place (catachresis) 
From what has now been suggested, I find that difference and the production of difference, or inevitable 
diversity, is made and premised in relation to the confirmation of demarcations of difference as if 
actually demarking meaning. What I will continue to suggest here is that meaning is never found, and it 
is paradoxically being made through that it is never found, dependent on discourse’s claims as if 
representing meaning – through the impossible attempt to localize it. That attempt see, because it is 
impossible, leads to an ever dislocating practice where meaning is practiced and thus taking place, 
through the subject’s need, but inability, to understand and reflect upon its own being (and so 
dependency on making an own, arbitrary and always unrepresented meaning in relation to discourse’s as 
if claimed meaning, that function merely as a organizational realm to able my own construction of 
meaning in improper reference to). This is a dislocating of nothing in to something. 
The arbitrary sign 
I will now explain how meaning, taking place in an arbitrary interpretation - and the affect of that 
meaning – is enabled by the sign that claim such being as inherent and is caused by the subject’s need to 
understand itself in the world. The status of the sign, in my weaving, is inadequate and secondary. But 
the sign, as a discursive representation, is through this very same vulnerability of arbitrariness that 
comes from not having the capability to represent, but ever yet functioning as a claim to do so, forceful 
– constructive and crucial - within the relationality that constitutes the subject’s being, that I am 
formulating. It is the deviousness that here is explained that both creates the sign as a sustainable effect-
maker, as well the potential of the subject in relation to the sign as without limits, but bound to this 
deviousness. The function of the sign in my understanding, is that of an arbitrariness that affect to 
meaningfulness/affect, through that it is weak and evasive, trough that it cannot signify something that is 
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not inherent in it, but still claim to do so. The function is productive and wholly inclusive through that 
very character of weakness and deviousness. Derrida ([1967]2016, [1972]1982) introduces the idea that 
signs (within language), that in my use is also what I refer to as representation or discursive claims, has 
no actual content, thus that the meaning of signs is only ever relational. With Derrida meaning takes 
place not in words but in between them - in their constitution in one another or rather in relation to one 
another as different, as reactions to the own difference presented by the other as different - those relating 
reactions differing or postponing a meaning that so becomes, through the production of difference. An 
example of the function is the dialectical constitution of the signs or demarcations, such as man and 
woman, of binary oppositions, where these signs affect into a meaningful possibility only when in 
relation to one another, also placing the actual meaning ascribed/interpreted in an always sensitive state 
of transformability (Derrida [1967]2016, [1972]1982, 1981). I so see that signs and concepts are 
demarcations that own no meaning in themselves, but nevertheless functions constructively through the 
relating’s dependency to their demarcation of difference, thus enabling meaning to be made in relation 
to them, ensuring that the meaning they amount to is never stable. I am a woman in a radically different 
manner than other persons ascribed and ascribing themselves as the symbol Woman, to the point where 
the only thing similar might be the demarcations of difference of my body. Interpreting Irigaray I see 
that my experience of being woman is not that of being a Woman but that of being this body, this 
consciousness, and that is all that I know about being. But certain parts and functions of my body and its 
molecular being has been marked as the symbol Woman. That is, it is the very demarcation, not the 
feeling of being that constitutes being a woman – because such a feeling might potentially be whatever 
(Irigaray 1980, 1983; Braidotti 2002). For example, in discourse, it is not that my uterus affects my 
experience into something specific, but that I have it that is important for it to work as a bearer of 
difference (even though my uterus in itself certainly affects my being, however, in itself, it cannot not 
affect my value). What that difference might be in terms of meaning however, has endless possibilities. 
Likewise the colour of my skin puts me into systems that demarks my skin a symbol that bears meaning, 
but that meaning is in total indetermination. But as I have been through, signs are however constructive 
through their claim to actually own meaning, in relation to that claim, I do construct meaning.  
  Whereas Derrida ([1972]1982) suggest that the sign is a quite violent imposition of trying to 
frame something unframable through conceptualization, I see that this imposition is nevertheless a 
failure, even if perceived actual, or rather as obviousness, and that perception is also what enable 
creativity around that imposition that is necessary because, as I have argued, the understanding practice 
is always part of the situation of the human being. What seems to happen is thus a construction beyond 
the reference to a construction. I suggest, that the possibility to create beyond what I think is possible is 
made possible, or rather is inevitable, through the signs failure to do what it claims to do, that claim 
becoming constructive of things that so always move beyond what is actually claimed.  
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The failing but creating locating attempt - catachresis 
What I find myself illustrating with this movement is a reading of Derrida’s concept of catachresis, 
further used also by Spivak (1990, 1999). Spivak defines catachresis as the act of “reversing, displacing 
and seizing the apparatus of value-coding”(Spivak 1990:228), an action that is made dependently in 
relation to a position that claims to, but impossibly could inhabit value apart from that relating. With 
Derrida catachresis is the movement happening through an indication of the original, but through the 
impossibility of that indication manifested is the originary incompleteness that is inherent in all systems 
of meaning (Derrida [1972]2016; Spivak 1990). As I understand it, this happen since there is no such 
originality nor inherent meaning in the signs, and so catachresis is the ever and inevitable dislocation 
and transformation of meaning that happens because of that incompleteness, but through which process 
meaning nevertheless take place. Derrida ([1972]2016) posture the sign as forcing itself upon a 
meaning, to the degree that signs cannot properly reflect meaning/experience/idea/materiality without 
the affect of that forcing, that is the conceptualization of what is not conceptualizable outside of 
understanding, thus that the sign imposed upon idea, upon meaning, is always a secondary sense that 
claim to properly reflect, but what by nature cannot do exactly that, and so that creates something else - 
something different from what it claims to do. That displacement is what I understand as the creative 
and quite ironic feature of inevitable catachresis as the being of meaning, that in this ever undefined and 
dislocated in-between-ness is taking place. What is explicated with catachresis as an inevitable occasion 
is how meaning is taking place contradictively trough the claim of it as >being>, a claim that is however 
impossibly true, and that claim resulting in a relating to that claim, a relating that so construct actual 
meaning. Meaning is so taking place, is enabled through an ever dislocation through that it is claimed as 
located – and in that relationality it comes to be – forever un-referred to. While a dictionary would 
normally define “catachresis” as “abuse or perversion of a trope or a metaphor” (Spivak 1999), because 
I with Spivak and Derrida have located meaning in the signs very arbitrariness, I find such misuse, such 
dislocation as both inevitable but also potentially enabling of possibilities of the only freedom of 
meaning we can have, given that there is no meaning inherent to dislocate, to misinterpret/use. We 
cannot miss the target if there is none, we can only displace it, and so that meaning is constructed within 
this very catachrestical/ever dislocating, inevitable happening. The relational state of being that I have 
already suspected is herein explained to me as happening through an ever deviousness, a constructivity 
that happens through the attempt of making what is unintelligible intelligible, and because there is no 
possibility to properly reflect, a new sense is always constructed. Through an appearance as if 
representing, thus as if imposing (defining), that is inevitably taking place because our necessity of a 
secondary practice of understanding the world, we construct things in relation to that claim of the sign, 
thus we always inevitably dislocate it in to an actual meaning, from nothing in to something, a 
something that will remain un-located by understanding.  
  What my movement in the world’s reliance on an always catachrestical understanding of 
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meaning means is that I potentially have the capacity to be anything through my incapacity to properly 
refer to this being without engaging in dislocating into yet another catachrestical movement – and 
ironically that incapacity is so constructive as a movement, ironically it is so, in this manner that 
subjectivity as an understanding and reflecting attempt creatively is partaking, manifest it self in the 
world. What this means is also that to make anything, in this ever evasive situation, we need to make 
reference to some sort of position of being, as if there, even if we can impossibly be localized as such a 
stability without interfering with it (into impossibility). This is no alternative – as suggested, the 
understanding practice and thus reliance upon the secondary claims of representation is already always 
part of me – because I am in the world. “The reader must accustom her self to starting from a particular 
situation and then to the ground shifting under her feet” (Spivak 1990: 219) Catachresis is for Spivak 
the situation of the subject as bound into an indeterminate specificity – the position of herself as an 
postcolonial academic, the paradoxical position of the postcolonial subject who’s desires has been 
formed in relation to the oppressive history in relation to what it tries to de-colonize itself. What I 
understand is that I am contradictively bound to the thought of an origin that is with my practice always 
transformed. Positions as signs, like cultural identities, are merely points of relating, not proper referents 
of the specificities of being. But I need those referents anyhow, and through so they become 
constructive of something, practices, dislocations that are actual practices in the world (Spivak 1990). In 
my interpretation, for Spivak >identity> and cultural identity, produced in relation to an origin of such 
an identity, and so categories and subject-positions are exactly such flash-points or footholds of this 
paradoxically constituting re-coding of meaning through inadequate claims. In my reading of Spivak I 
understand that catachresis where meaning so deviously happen in a constant dislocation through failed 
locating, is founded upon this desire, this attempt to understand one as inhabiting a meaning definable 
with these claims, such as cultural identities, amounting to a constructive circuitry of re-coding where 
meaning, where cultural practices, where subjectivity so take place – forever dislocated and dislocating 
through the reflexive practice (Spivak 1990). Paradoxically, ironically, deviously, in relation to these 
claims that even claim to represent me, my struggles of life will be, I will construct my involvement in 
the world.  
The catachrestical performance that is my being 
I am speaking here of the actuality of my being in (as part of) the world, my movement of it. In my 
understanding, the catachresis explained above needs to be understood as constituting of this movement, 
this performativity, originating from my being in the world, not something outside that being. The 
movement inflicted on the world by the subject is not, as assumed suggested by Butler and Foucault, 
given to it by discourse’s claims about its being. Performativity is not a result of or in the hands of the 
other or the otherness from the subject where its subjectivity is constituted. Performativity is constructed 
through a relationality where all of these things is a consequence of the subject itself as part of the 
world. I am in the world, thus is my dependency to create an understanding of it is already in me. I make 
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that understanding, that understanding result in practices that partake in the world – practices always 
unrepresented and unrecognised by me. And in this situation of being, change is not an option but it is 
built into the very meaning-making as a dislocation of nothing into something always else, something 
actual, never - impossibly - same, but something neither ever understood as else. What this is, is 
performativity as catachresis, inevitably composed through my being in the world, and always 
inevitably assuming change.  
  My subjectivity is a result of my attempt to reflect, both in understanding myself as a subject, 
and the practices I perform to attempt to understand. I cannot be a result of understanding’s claims as 
something else directing me, because the understanding is mine, discourse nothing in itself. Discourse, 
that what claims to be understanding, explaining, referring, is merely my relating to it, and it is made 
from the need I have to understand the world I am always in – amounting to an ever, wholly 
constructive, dislocating of nothing that is my performativity. Being, becoming, happens as an ever 
unrepresented, unintelligible transformation, through my attempt to understand.  
The failing but creating locating attempt 
 So where are we now, when it comes to the relation between discourse, subjectivity and materiality? 
Subjectivity is the attempt to understand one >self> in the world as well as the practices that this desire 
and attempting affect to, and understanding cannot be done apart from concepts that are discursive, thus 
the >self> as understood is always within discourse, whereas experience, where the experience of >self> 
is part, needs to be understood as extensively more than discourse (but that understanding, of course 
cannot be done apart from discourse). Subjectivity of the conscious mind is thus dependent upon 
discourse to perform its self-reflecting/understanding practice, resulting in relating practices that are 
formatting materiality as well as bending discourse to fit and attempt to include that existence into 
discourse, resulting in yet different relating to an endless diversity and changeability of claims that are 
never fully taking place outside of the understanding of them as so, that quite seamlessly passes as 
explaining the world as it is. What is here concluded is an ironic deviousness where meaning take place 
through that we do not, we impossibly succeed in doing that what we attempt to do, and through that 
failure, something is done – in some kind of radical catachresis. Discourse is affecting the world through 
subjectivities relating practices, dependent on discursive claims to attempt to understand itself and so 
relating to those claims. But discourse is a result of the subject in the world - is coming from the 
subjects need to understand that world. Discourse as power and the actual meaning of its claims is so 
dialectically bound to subjectivity’s impossible task to understand itself through its concepts, of 
subjective practises that confirm discourse as affecting matter through the subject confirming through 
paradoxically adapting its claims merely through relating to them, interpreting them in arbitrary ways – 
that arbitrary interpretation and the relating practice that is the affect of that interpretation is the only 
meaning discourse take - and its function: to enable an always impossible attempt for the human to 
understand it self as a self in the world – while through that impossible attempt, performatively creating 
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things that will, through the catachrestical nature of understanding, remain unreflected, but that are 
however constructive.  
The me in you and the relating practice – the motion of the subject 
>I> need >something> to rely on  
What becomes distinctively clear, is that whereas Foucault and Butler suggest discourse as inevitably 
both enabling and restricting the possibilities of being, that does not mean that discourse limit existence 
in the form of a total subjection to it. Subjugating is a process of relating, not of making discourse true 
trough enacting it. If there is no substance in concepts to enact in a truthful manner, subjectivity is 
simply relating to discourse, interpreting its claims in different ways. As concluded, the inadequate and 
secondary state of understanding so entails subjects as confessing themselves as the subject-positions 
offered by discourse, actually only in discourse, not in actual experience. The understandable subject is 
not the same thing as experienced subjectivity, however these things can neither be separated. Subject-
positions are a >lie> as an discursive idea, but not a lie as a practice of relating to these ideas. As the 
catachrestical movement establish, the claim of something stable, amounts into practices that are 
constructive, while they nevertheless cannot fulfill that claim of >thingness> as a thing – because it is 
only in relation to that claim not as that claim that discourse affect. Through being premised by 
understanding principles that are never able to actually understand, the subject as a definable substance 
can only take place as a discursive claim. The substance of the subject in understanding appear as a 
phantom, moved and changed by every attempt to capture it. That attempt though is constructive for the 
subject’s actual movement in the world. Quite deviously, in relation to the faulty claim of substance in 
discourse itself, through the inevitable dislocating of that nothingness that is made through my 
interpretation of what that substance is, substance is made. Discourse’s claim to represent is 
constructive, in that it enables my meaning-making relating to it, my interpreted understanding of my 
self and the world that amounts into performative practices in the world that affect that world, affect 
experience and so other peoples interpretations - thus changing discourses effects. In relation to 
discourses claims I subject in different ways, but with this relation - my attempt to reflect on and 
understand my being – what I feel to understand is not actualized, but in this attempt, something that is 
my movement, is. My desires and so performative act, my subjectivity, is always inseparably formed in 
this relation of attempted reflection.When the definition of homo-and heterosexuality became part of a 
discursive truth-regime people was able to define them selves as gay or straight, but not because they 
were those things. The concepts of hetero and homosexuality are delimiting attempts to frame 
(understand) a diversity that cannot be framed. But when claimed understood, subjects relate to those 
claims of what their sense of self is – self-reflection enabled. This process initiate creation not of the 
concepts in themselves, but other things; diverse >sexual> behaviour that will remain unreflected, but 
that are dependently made in relation to attempted understandings of different behaviour. And all other 
	   60	  
unconzeptualized experience will inseparably be involved with this constructive relating as well. 
Inseparably from the entanglement of this relating practice to delimiting and inadequate concepts I 
construct my life. 
I need you to get involved 
I have now argued that my being in the world is the composition of a relationality where my specific 
being in the world in itself also matters since I am part of it. Because I am always already in the world, I 
am always already in the situation of facing other people as well as being with and of materiality. 
Agreed with Butler (2005, 2015), to face another human being is to face my self. When I see another 
being I am able to see my own body as something separate from it, which is how my sense of self is 
evolved from the actual situation of togetherness, and makes my self always dependent upon the relation 
to what is not it. The mark of difference calls upon me as an appearance of a face that makes me realize 
my own face, and a point of reference in relation to what I can define the characteristics of my own face, 
and in so defining what is >me> through the localization of differences. This principal of identification 
through separation will always be in this situation of my actual existence in the world because I am 
always together in the world.	  I am a definable something in relation to a definable else, that calls on my 
understanding and self-reflecting praxis that amounts to my subjective performative involvement, I am 
never without this constructive relating. The mediation of me to you that always happen in our situation 
of togetherness also implicates affect. You change because I am always performing my understanding in 
relation to you, however, I have always been in this situation together with you, thus I have never been 
unchanged by you, I am myself a catachresis. I need to attempt to understand my situation because of 
this very situation I am always in, and my secondary and mediated understanding thence become 
inseparable from my experience, becomes inseparable as part of this very same situation. It is not an 
imposition of knowledge from an otherness that construct my being, but it is the very material premise 
of me as part of the world, that also include my understanding practice and so that involve that practice 
in materiality. The subject in the world must be understood as a material being of specific experience of 
the world it is part of together with others, that it so attempts to understand, an understanding praxis that 
so also is part of that experience, thus the subject’s movement in the world. The subject’s experience 
and movement in the world so happens through that it is entangling discourse, subjectivity, materiality 
as a relationality residing in the subject being in the world.  
Relationality 
I now want to summarize where I am in my weaving, what I see has already taken form as a 
relationality, and how this relationality has helped with an understanding where the problems I had with 
change as well as originality in my Foucauldian and Butlarian understanding. My reading of Foucault 
and Butler weaves into my understanding that the things that we are able to >be> in the world are so 
always bound to the premises of understanding that terms those definitions as only created through our 
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arbitrary relating to them, and so >being> is only ever in this relationality, actually terming it as never 
being that being, but attempting to be it. Concepts of being are so, even if we never fill them with our 
selves, never become them - nor do they represent us - neither disengaged from us, but exactly 
consolidated through us. We are enabled through relating to the impossible being that it claims, and 
paradoxically those claims are effectively taking part in the world through that ever failing relation of 
not materializing them, because it amounts into practices that manifest subjectivity, enabled through my 
relating to discourse in always arbitrary ways, as a partaking in the world, thus a constant inevitable 
changing of that world, through the very composition of my being in it as an entanglement where the 
dimension of discourse, subjectivity and materiality functions through me as a relationality. - My desires 
are made in relation to arbitrary understandings of representations resulting in performative actions that 
changes the world.  
   In so the practice of relating consist the subject’s (as a relation of representation, desire and 
performativity) manifestation in the world, and coins subjectivity as a productive movement of it, as a 
relationality that is dependent upon relating to a demarcation as if signifying, in that inevitably 
dislocating process being constructive of something actual. In this relationality that conditions my being 
as taking place through the intricate relations between discourse, subjectivity and materiality, that I find 
are inseparably entangled to constitute the enabling of the subject as a movement in the world, or rather 
it is always already the subject in the world, it is happening through the composition of my being in the 
world, the subject does become and move also through its constitution in a constant relating to an 
>elsewhere> that it is always in, wherein the subject also appear as a relating point of reference in it self 
– a subjectivity, that thus induces in a failing but constructive understanding praxis. In this situation I 
am always in, my desires and creative practices so paradoxically takes place though relating to discourse 
as if representing/understanding, but ends up in constructing something that will never be 
represented/understood – however experienced - constituting the subjects affect on the world. Though 
that discourse bear no meaning in it self, but works only through a relationality, subjection to discourse 
is always inevitably a failure. Under these premises subjectivity as a relating practice that attempts an 
impossible self-reflection actually amounts to a constant dislocation – the subject >is> not, it is only 
ever becoming, but it is becoming through the attempt to >be>, to be acknowledged as being, and 
understand that being it self. Placing the subject as an ever becoming through this relating and 
practicing, is amounting to an ever dislocation of both the subject’s being (that is its becoming state) as 
well as the being of meaning. Meaning, as something that affects in the world, cannot be located, but is 
produced through this constant relating, is so happening in the world through the relationality that 
condition it as a constant dislocation, a catachresis, that was never a something to dislocate to begin 
with, but through the relationality the displacement amounts to meaning. This is how our desires, 
however constructed dependently to what makes them in every sense non-free, always contingent to 
claims that does not represent what is possible, because they are nothing in them selves, are actually 
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partaking in the world, through that they are part of a relationality where things are constructed, and 
where you and me take place, changing, indeterminate but dependent. This is how we are in some sense 
free; ironically through that we cannot appreciate that freedom for what it is; ironically though that we 
create our possibilities through an ever failed attempt to identify those possibilities; ironically through 
that we are dependent.  
Hybrid specificity 
I have come to the insight that nothing but my being in the world itself can direct my performativity, the 
change that I do. That the meaning I make of the world, thus what motivates my potential in it, does not 
originate in anything apart from this very situation. Discourse is nothing in itself to direct me, but is part 
of this relationality, I know that the change I do needs to be induced from my position of interpretation, 
my specific situation of being in the world. I will now engage in explaining why this position is specific, 
and so how the change I make through my being in the world as a relationality is not only an inherent 
possibility, but that I change is given within this situation.  
Specificity/dependency 
I, my subjectivity, take place as a constant becoming in relation, through understanding myself as 
something in relation to something else, thus, I understand, in transformation always through the 
dependency to that what I relate to. Through my attempt to be recognized as a static being via definition 
enabled only through that relating practice I so ensure my transformation. The faulty and devious but 
utterly constructive relating process of understanding and self-reflection is thus dependent upon the 
relation to an alterity, an other of that me, for the idea of the entity of my self to self-reflect upon, an 
inside that so become apparent in this relation, to be made possible. This dependency of identification to 
separation of what thus manifest as exactly the opposite of something separate, but dependent, is always 
in the conditions of my being, because I am always in the world (Spivak 1990; Butler 2005; Foucault 
1993). In my inevitable attempt to self-reflect and understand in this situation I use secondary discursive 
concepts of understanding to relate an intelligible reflection of a self through, thus engaging in a 
constant dislocating of what this is. I am an always undefined becoming through my attempt to locate 
my being. My self-reflection and so subjectivity, thus creativity, is dependent on how existence is 
discursively presented in a given historical context, to creatively relate to. The possibilities of the 
subject is always specific to contextual regimes of intelligebility, not in that I am here transmitted from 
contextual discourse, but that my relating premise is dependent upon this contextual organization to 
interpret something arbitrary and specific from it. In my understanding, contextually specific regimes of 
understanding orders the ontology of the subject it self as a self, thus enabling the manifestations of my 
self, not as that self  but as myself, my actual being – however always somehow else than what I am 
suggested as. In other words, my dependency to a reflecting practice makes my desire, subjectivity and 
act dependent upon a contextual system of signs, as if they were meaning, that so makes my reflection 
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and so being specific to it. But importantly also utterly specific of the node of me in the world, as an 
entangling of experience of materiality and my understanding praxis of that materiality, that is also 
affected by my act in relation to that understanding praxis, that is – the relationality of my being. My 
experience is of a specific point in a material world – my body, its functions in themselves that I feel, of 
material circumstances that determines my current specific position and relations in them. These 
experiences affects my interpretation, but they also always involves themselves with my attempted 
understanding of what is here taking place, entangling this into a further specificity in this utter 
dependency situation always in connection with a spatiality and the connectivity of that spatiality but 
that is tempered into something specific in my interpretation through understandings realms, thus in my 
experience, thus in my own interaction with the world (Haraway 2008; Braidotti 2002; Irigaray 
[1983]1993). This creates involvement to a point where we can not separate our practices from the 
affect of those realms of understanding, not merely because we otherwise cannot attempt to understand 
our practice, but because also that attempt to understand affecting our performance of life, thus others in 
the world, thus specificities of interpretation. My being in the world is thus utterly specific, through my 
positions complete dependency.    
The claims that triggers my creativity 
In my understanding, to function in togetherness without essence, normalizing processes helps us to 
figure that togetherness out through that we come to an agreement of that concepts represent, however 
not what they represent. We conceptualize our diversity of relating to discourses claims to define us (as 
categories of being), into appeared sameness, however our difference remain. This is how 
heteronormative practices, gender roles, cultural practices etc are confirmed into a stabilized appearance 
with our attempt but failure to comprehend being. I locate my position in conceptual understanding 
merely through signifying demarcations of difference such as that I have a cis-male partner, and so I 
confirm and reify that concept of heteronormativity with my hetero-practice, even if it does not actually 
capture or adequately represent the specificity of my sexual being. The conformation of my specificity 
to such a conceptual demarcation of difference does not include value, the implication does not establish 
that I do or feel heterosexuality in the same way as someone else that use the concept to understand 
themself. Perhaps I have a more similar experience with my male partner than an other woman. 
However referents that claim to refer to the materiality of me, the demarcations of difference in my 
being, enabling reflection, are consistent in a system of understanding. Thus, through my material 
existence and need to reflect upon it, I can never escape involvement with such value-making in relation 
to that claim, nor can I confirm similarities or difference in actual experience into my understanding, 
thus neither mediate that potentiality – it will remain unknown.   
  The concepts I use to understand myself, are not actual. However, my practices in relation to 
them are actual, taking place. As are the limitations in the form of laws and oppressive institutional 
structures and material recourses, as well as attitudes and normative exclusions and hierarchies in 
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society, that forces my practice, organized with conceptual categorization, and the struggles against this 
oppression, as the community around it (hooks [1992]2015). The claim is empty, but it functions, is 
worked into human experience, practices, emotion and subjectivity, affecting through this relationality. 
bell hooks state that race is a device, it is not inherent in me, – but that that device is real, and that 
people suffer utterly from such devices realness “And that it is pointless to pretend that it doesn’t exist – 
merely because it is a lie”(hooks [1992]2015: 27). Also Spivak points to that histories of collective 
identity is not the result of that identity as a historical originality, but rather a result of that very claim of 
a history definable as a substantial identity, an originality to what I belong. However these histories 
inevitably takes part in constructing the life and needs of people that both need that reference point to 
create subjectivity as well as collective struggle. The point of reference to something substantial, even if 
an artifact, is inseparably involved in the construction of lives, matter, practices, desires and specificities 
(Spivak 1990). And this constructive relating is not a choice - we are to relate to discourse to become 
recognizable at all, relating is a consequence of being in the word as a consciousness, and it is 
specificities of situation, that is inescapably formed also with hierarchal relations of power and 
dominance that introduces us into material and discursive situations involved with race, class, gender, 
sexuality, bodily function, age, appearance etc that conditions our possibilities of relating. These limits 
and the hierarchy and dominance functioning in them, to what we all are forced to relate in different 
ways, makes my specificity and experience utterly different from a gay persons or a person of color, 
even though my experience probably also differs from persons forced to subject to the same discursive 
claims (depending on signifying demarcations of difference in our bodies or circumstances) as me. In 
my interpretation, Spivak suggest desires are constructed from a subjectivity from a specific position 
that is dependently constructed also in relation to repressive and hierarchal realms. Identitarian 
emancipatory struggles are with that struggle constructing the practices of the claimed identity. Thus the 
identity is dependent upon the realms that the identity is in defiance of, when the identity is nothing in 
itself but a becoming through history, now actually consisting as those struggling practices, intricately 
involved in the lives of those who struggles. (Spivak 1990). In other words, points of reference, 
discursive realms that are often the cause of oppression because of their hierarchal categorization 
structuring society, but also my only chance to understand myself as something, even if nothing in 
themselves, has bound my subjectivity, the history of my specificity, to them. The desires that make me 
move in the world, are constructed in relation to both claims of historical belonging, as well as the 
repressive realms that calls that history, that belonging, into relevance. All of my life, my practices, 
pleasures, desires, loves as well as pains, as entangled phenomena in my experience, is dependently and 
historically formatted in this relation – bounding the temporary, current specificity of me to situations of 
power, sociality and materiality that I might want to change. In my reading, this is also what Spivak 
suggest is exactly the predicament of her own postcolonial situation: To critique something in relation to 
what all of her current being is dependent upon, even building onto that critiquing. Here is a 
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catachrestical strive to search for a originality that no longer speaks of her, but in relation to what, as in 
relation to the oppressive and violent history, her very struggle and identity, its practiced life builds 
upon, and it moves the world through those practices (Spivak 1990).  
  This specific situation of me is so utterly dependent, but it is also utterly transformative, hybrid, 
indeterminate through that dependency of my specificity. I continuously displace what I am through a 
reflecting relation to discourse’s claims about what that is. However never defining nor adequately 
representing me, all that is me is dependent upon the woman-claim, merely because I am never without 
the situation of relating to it. What I am right in this moment, the desires, pleasures and practices of me, 
is specifically dedicated to a relation to discourse. Even if me being woman is a completely inadequate 
representation of my being - all of my current specificity of being is dependently involved with this 
claim of me. My loves, my desires, my pains and my everyday beings cannot be encapsulated into the 
Woman-sign, but nevertheless has my historical production of these things and practices, my experience 
and so interpretation of the world been chiseled inseparably in an entanglement with my relation to this 
claim. As are my experience of my bodily functions that has been ascribed the woman-sign, involving 
themselves with this symbolic claim of meaning, into inseparability. In experience concepts does not 
function as concepts, because they do not exist as so, but these separations falls into dependent 
inseparability - ensuring all that is me into an utter specificity of being, never represented by discourse, 
but involved with it into the undefined and so the unimpressionable. That discourse’s claims are 
inevitable points of reference, as if meaning, in relation to what my specificity is dependently becoming, 
means for example that transgender positions are intricately dependent upon the restrictive realms of the 
signifiers of the binary man and woman, that what violently also oppresses, for the specificity of lives 
relating to the trans-position as transition to be that specificity of pleasure and desire but also pain. Also 
the trans-sign is a delimiting concept dependent to other discursive concepts, and through that delimiting 
but inadequate attempt to define someone’s being it also enables creativity of such being. However, 
specificities are not doomed to this exact dependency, on the contrary, because we are dependent, there 
is no determination to what we could be, but if the dependency changes, so will all in me. In fact, I 
suggest that I cannot stay the same. 
The meeting of difference  
What I here find as a seemingly contradictive juxtaposition that nevertheless premise positional being as 
well as ensure movement in the world, is that this very same dependency that assures my specificity of 
being, combined with that specificity, also premises that specificity to be totally hybrid, transformative, 
moving – that my existence is a hybrid specificity. This involvement is made from the composition of 
my own being in the world, I, in myself but always in the world am an entangling being that moves the 
world through the specificity my entangling create. In this specificity that is me, the meaning I make 
with my understanding praxis is in some sense given – but only to the exact specific little context of me 
in the world and the functions composing that being, thus assuring the interpretations and 
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performativity, the subjectivity made from such little contexts, from different hybrid specificities, 
diverse, and so affecting one another into further difference, further specificity, further transformation.        
What I have suggested is that my desires and pleasure that drives my subjectivity and practices in the 
world is always a result of my attempt to understand my self and the world. Inadequate referentials that 
claim value onto points of material difference make me not only se my actual being as a difference, but 
they claim that being to have a specific value. A value that can never be defined, in itself suggested by 
these referents, but that I create through my inevitable relating to it as if suggesting value - which is my 
attempt to understand my self. And through my constant misinterpretation of that claim as something – I 
practice my constructive being that so changes the world into what was/is never defined, never 
suggested. These realms come into constructivity merely through the material proof of a difference from 
me, that makes me attempt to understand that difference as well as the difference of me. Bhabha’s 
understanding of production of cultural difference enables my interpretation of what happen in this 
meeting with difference that I am always in through being in the world. Even if not reflecting any 
previous, determined cultural traits, the articulation of cultural difference produces cultural traits when 
cultural traits are performed in relation to that articulation. The claim of culture is a way to restage the 
past through introducing tradition into the present, but that restaging paradoxically import other cultural 
temporalities into the invention of tradition – making it rather into an ever becoming, always 
transforming tradition. In it self the very process of claiming tradition – claiming culture in a fixed form 
- so makes any access to original identity or ‘authentic’ tradition impossible because it is hybridized in 
the very process (Bhabha [1994]2004). My commitment is dependent on the sign that I commit to as if it 
represented my value, and my inevitably specific commitment to it is constructive of the very same 
transformation that proves the instability of that sign – but that trough this deviousness is constructive 
for my specific creativity. The inevitable hybridity of cultural positions are thus always negotiations of 
dislocation from the borderline of claiming something impossible but in that claiming producing cultural 
things, practises, difference, anyhow, and so that hybridity does not extinguish difference, but entertains 
it, however, the dependency to the relating to a meeting with difference, ensures it in a transformative 
state, and it is productive of something substantial through the claims inability to refer to that substance.  
Struggles to what I depend  
So I suggest that in my relating to a claim that claims to define me, I can make nothing but unintelligible 
difference. Relating to a sign without inherent meaning, ensures me to do that relating different from the 
next person, if we neither presume that there is an universal essence of being to direct a homogeneous 
interpretation of what that sign means. It needs to be the creativity and pleasure I find in relating to a 
certain claim, dependent upon my hybrid specificity that determine how my relating will come out. 
Subjection to the dominant normative sign (all signs are per definition normative), such as 
performatively assigning to heterosexuality, is explained by the privileges of the norm it self. iii But also 
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the subversive position needs to be creatively pleasurable. If my heteronomativity is a performativity 
explained through that I discipline my desires to the norm that privileges me, not an essence of my being 
(Butler [1990]2007), then a homosexual performativity needs to have an equally unessential 
explanation. How come people subvert the norm if it is so dominating in its idealizing of itself? Why I 
relate to a claim in a certain manner, why I find certain things pleasurable and others not, needs to be the 
result of that these things are all tangled up in me, my relation to something involving itself with my 
relation to everything else. Not only is my specificity of life entangled through my historical and 
material struggle to what has been repressing my life – but the concepts that I use to understand myself 
are not working as separate concepts with inherent meaning in my experience, thus neither in my 
performativity. Actually, I suggest that the specific pleasure that I get in the specificity of me, dependent 
on the woman-claim of me to what I inevitably relate all of me to, because concepts does not work as 
concepts in my experience - that pleasure is involved to the point of dependency to also that what 
inflicts me pain. – Because through this involvement of impressions in me – this inseparability is what 
composes my specificity. Thus the pleasures found in the queer, the trans, the disabled, the black, the 
female, the male position, that what intrigues my subjective creativity and desires in the relating to 
position – is inseparable from that what makes this position vulnerable, painful and even dangerous. It 
needs to be so, that the danger of the subversive act is in itself something creatively pleasurable, or at 
least entangled with that pleasure. 
What I have explained is my being always in a situation of dependency but utter transformativity. The 
relationality of me in the world entangles my practices, feelings, my body, my desires, pleasures, 
struggles always with that discursive premise of understanding myself and the world. Those claims of 
me that are nothing in themselves, enable my self-reflection affecting into my creative movement of the 
world. My performativity so is not directed by anything other than my own specificity of being in the 
world wherein my attempt but failure to understand it is constructive of this undetermined possibility. 
Here, through the impossibility of my reflection but my attempt to reflect, my potential is unprohibited 
and undetermined, through that my actual possibility can not be the object of my desire - because it can 
be no such delimited object of understanding, only a dislocation made in relation to the claim of it. In 
terms of determination I am thus in some sense free, but not in any sense that I can ever reflect upon, 
never account as my own conscious free will. In so, through this sort of always unrepresented freedom 
where no realms define, we are all really very queer. It is the possibility through incapability, the 
movement through an ever failure to direct my move, and so freedom from limits (of understanding) 
that such a directive from my will is always bound to - but that this inevitable attempt is nevertheless 
what triggers the creativity of me, that I will now engage in. 
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The turning subject – the constructive deviousness of my reflection 
I have explained a situation where meaning is made only in relation the claim of meaning, where the 
sign is nothing in itself, however constructive for my creativity to be made dependently in reference to. I 
find myself in a situation of being in the world where I inevitably move it through a deviousness, an 
ever escaping of that what I try to reflect and so consciously act upon, the meaning I try to understand as 
apart me, but through what process meaning is however taking place, and thus is proved exactly only 
through me, however always exceeding my attempt to own it. Human understanding is here ever 
expelled to a distance of trying to observe, where the inevitable conceptualizing practice that organizes 
my understanding thought, creates a dislocation in my understanding of that what I observe and believe 
to understand, that itself engages in the world through that it affects my experience. Actually, what I 
have come to, is that even if impossibly successful, it is my very own sense of self, making me 
attempting to understand, reflect upon that self, that makes me inevitably move the world – even if I 
merely intended to establish it into knowledge. And so that it is my sense of self, and failure reflect upon 
myself, that creates a manifestation of my subject in the world as a movement of/in it, that is my self as 
an object of perception, that I ironically cannot myself understand. 
A very constructive failure 
As I understand it, the momentarily subjecting confession in relation to contextual realms of 
understanding, is constructive not only for my understanding of self, but through that this self-reflecting 
attempt result in my actual practices of subjectivity. My sense of self in relation to the world induces me 
in an attempt to understand that self in the world, inevitably through understanding’s secondary 
conceptual realms, engaging me in the construction of my subjectivity, an entanglement of my attempt 
to understand and the materiality that I will never understand, in turn engaging my performative act in 
the desires here relationally evolving, into a movement in the world that is my act. My performativity is 
so always involved with discourse as a function however not determined by discourse as anything. In 
other words, the practices of subjectivity is always dependent on discourse, because they are a result of 
my attempt to understand, however because discourse does not actually have a representing capacity of 
what it claims to understand, my practices in relation to my understanding are undetermined, and as I 
will explain, become through my continuing failure to reflect upon them.  
Butler has explained my subjectivity as a both painful and pleasurable play of relating to, attempting to 
enact representations. I try out, consume and resist them and in this performative citation I am 
constantly disproving the essence/authenticity to my subjective practices through that I am dependent 
upon this relating (Butler [1990]2007, [2004]2006). In my understanding, what is happening here is 
merely the very relating, not of anything in itself, thus the outcome of the relating is undetermined 
however we do it. What happens here, with this inevitable performative citation of something that does 
not exist in itself, is my inevitable and continuously constructive failure to >be>, thus my continuous 
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becomingiv. But this inevitable misinterpretation of nothingness, this forever catachrestical dislocation is 
creative. Discourse offers the concept that enables the relating reflection, and to attempt to reflect on 
myself, it is inevitably to such conceptual limitations I can relate my being. To for example reflect upon 
the sexual practices I do or do not do, I so need to relate to discursive concepts that claim to define 
different sexualities. In so I inevitably also confirm those discursive understandings, claims about 
sexuality as conceptual, no matter how I actually practice sexual things. Through relating to the claims 
about sexuality I am not only able to attempt to understand my self, defining such a self in relation to 
them, but in experience and practices from that relating, I am actually becoming. Because the need and 
attempt to understand is what creates my subjectivity this means that resistance and subversion of 
dominant norms, is also results of dependently relating to discourse, and thus inevitably also failing any 
resistance as understood, because that understanding is made in relation to something that does not 
really exist except from that very interpretation of it, that that subject’s resistance is. A queer 
subjectivity needs the discursive claim of a normative subjectivity to create itself as queer in relation to, 
to itself dislocate what that concept of queerness is. Even if we cannot determine our act, it is equally 
affecting into change nevertheless, and actually, this failing status of our attempt to be anything defined, 
kind of suggest us all to be resisting, because we never maintain, we only change.  
  What I suggest is that my performative act is a result of my very attempt to reflect upon my 
practice, to define my self understandable, as to able a representation of that intelligible self with my 
subjective practices. Because of that understanding involves itself with what it is to understand, into 
what I have explained an ever dislocation of its meaning, my self-reflexive attempt is an ever failure. 
But my attempt is nevertheless constructive of the very same practice, the self in the world, that it aims 
to but cannot reflect. It is not so that reflection represent the movement of the subject, it actually moves 
the subject, it is intricately part in what makes the subject creatively partaking in the world. This turns 
out a wholly devious and quite ironic situation: I am taking a constructive part in the world through my 
impossibly successful attempt to understand myself, that failed attempt constructive of that self that I 
want to understand. This entail not only meaning, but the actual being of the subject as part of the world 
into an ever catachrestical dislocation – a dislocation where the being of the subject is taking place 
through the actual impact of the sense of self’s desire but impossibility to understand itself as something 
in itself – as a reflectable substance of being a subject. The sense of self involves the situation of being 
into understanding and thus into constructive catachresis, because of the reflective need that that sense 
of self entail.   
The turning subject 
I will now expand on my suggestion of this figuration of my catachrestical being in the world – of this 
devious subject that I seem to be - as a movement in the world, as something actual in my self through 
my very sense of self. This >agency> of the self however, does not implicate any conscious directive of  
potential. What I suggest is an utter devious situation of myself in the world and my understanding of 
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that being, induced by the composition of my very own situation of being in the world. My attempt to 
understand is here crucially understood as an inevitable consequence of my existing in the world – a 
situation I have never been without, thus I am not >I> without it – the reflexive attempt needs to be part 
of my very composition. I here understand reflexivity inspired by that what Haraway (1992) has termed 
diffraction, that sees my attempt to from my specific position reflect my self as a point of my own, 
through relating to different phenomena in my contextual surrounding. In that relation I attempt to find 
my self as something, a singular point that is so constituted as defined in relation to several or an infinity 
of other points, where my reflection as diffraction so is found. What I suggest is that trough the 
impossibility of this reflexive attempt, the attempt to reflect moves the world, and that movement can 
neither be reflected upon, cannot be represented without yet again performing an interpretation that 
catachrestically dislocates, through the movement of reflecting, what it aims to reflect. But the 
inevitable attempt to reflect on movement is nevertheless what induces this constructive movement. To 
further explicate this figure, I need to weave into my understanding the physicist Nils Bohr’s, simple 
statement explaining a ground principal of quantum physics, brought to my attention by the further 
complexion of it by Karen Barad (2007). This is the statement that “We are part of the world that we 
observe”. In a very simplifying sense, this statement encapsulate a very important insight about the 
world that the laws of quantum physics tells us about, or at least the way I find it constructive in my 
weaving. This insight enlighten that our observation of the world, takes part in the world and thus 
changes it, hence we can’t reflect any static state of it. (Barad 2007). The reference/interpretation or 
reflexive practice of a representation, a sign that claims to by its very nature reflect and represent the 
world, is undeniably also part of that world that is claims to reflect. Weaving quantum physics together 
with Kantian philosophy I see that conceptualization, that is the separating of phenomena into separate 
entities, is made by the structure of human thinking and language, not by and neither in the world itself, 
and the experience of it, that this understanding and mediation refer to. However my understanding 
attempt and thus conceptualization is part of the world, because it is me who perform it, it cannot be 
outside this being. Thus not only is my reflexive and understanding practice not representing being in an 
adequately reflecting way, but it is doing something with that world that is claims to only represent. As 
quantum physics as well as Kant and Derrida suggest, concepts does not exist, thus in the connectivity 
and entanglement of all in the world, I am so affecting into indetermination, as diffraction, also through 
the conceptualizing practice in my understanding attempt that is so inevitably always affecting what it 
claims to be reflecting. Thus my reflecting practice is simultaneously moving/displacing that what it was 
to reflect with that reflecting attempt – hence continuously placing that in our experience what we want 
to reflect upon in inaccessibility of that reflection – through that very reflecting. In so reflexivity shows 
to be a performative action taking part in moving the state of the world, because it is part of it, because I 
am part of it, through the impossibleness of its claimed nature. As stated, it is an ever failing attempt 
that displaces that what it attempts to locate, moving through so, constructing in that movement, and 
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thus inflicts another reflecting attempt that displaces into movement... Here the subject assert itself as a 
figure, the movement of me as a sense of self in the world appears as an ever turning practice. The 
becoming of the subject manifest as the figure of The Turning Subject. Part of my being’s composition 
is the entangling characteristic of consciousness that imposes the need for me to try to understand my 
self in the world, to self-reflect, thus to relate myself to the discursive concepts of understanding, 
depending on the demarcations of difference upon my body and practice that I feel and so want to reflect 
upon – this being bounds me to this twirling state I am in, that so is creative, (meaning that I am creative 
trough my attempt to understand), but that also puts me always out of my own reach, when all I wanted 
was to reach myself.  
This is how I understand that meaning is happening, always inevitably in change because it is forever 
dislocated – it can only ever be dislocated since it does not own any inherent meaning, and the 
interpretation that dislocates it is always done from a hybrid specificity that is ensured to be specific also 
through this very always involvement of the subject in matter and understanding that matter. This 
dislocating affect of discourse are affecting and is constructive with subjectivities manifestation in the 
world as a performative practice inevitably always in relation to discourse but that is also inseparably 
involved with non-discursive aspects, that so happens to change that world, and construct things and 
different beings in it. In other words, change and productivity where the human and human 
understanding (agency) is part happens only as a relationality, not through anything that is ever 
understandable as a thingness, a directness in it self – this relationality is thus devious but nevertheless 
constructive and constitute the premises of our manifestation as part of the world.  
The friction of my being 
I have now come to the point where I need to gather the consequences of my suggested being. I have 
come to an understanding of the subject’s being in the world as that of an assemblage of materiality, 
discourse and subjectivity, as a relationality, that is the consequence of its premises of existence. What I 
have assembled is a notion of how these premises of my own existence in a world I am always in, or 
rather what my existence in that world composes, gathers as a friction that induces me to move the 
world, through my movement in it, through this force of my being. 
  From my weaving, I have come to the conclusion that our seeming homogeneity of 
understanding, that make our societal context function, that has lead to a common belief that either we 
do understand and with language and signifying systems represent being as it is, or that systems of 
words and representations in them self has a capability of value that makes us interpret them 
homogeneously, thus that meaning somehow lies in a discursive sphere beside us, that transmit to and 
leads us into normativity, but that in my understanding can be neither of those things, and neither that 
our understanding can ever be something homogeneous. Understanding can be not a definable point of 
value in itself, thus the inducement of an ever dislocation of what it might be leads to practices in the 
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world. In togetherness we involve in a constant misinterpretation of one another but that we reach to 
conclusion is the same, because we need to put it into a symbolic system to mediate it, which organize 
meaning in a manner so that we seem to refer to the same thing, but that does not determine the meaning 
organized. This means that we are not same, that there is not an ideological sameness as if a substance 
somewhere mediable onto us - that such a sameness does not constitute us into sameness, even if the 
apparatus of our mediable understanding seems to point us to that conclusion. We so are, we perceive, 
we perform utterly different. But we are dependent on that togetherness of difference that we are in, to 
attempt to understand ourselves as something and thus produce ourselves as something – my 
subjectivity is initiated by this friction. But it is not a friction that is outside me. It is a friction that is 
already in my situation of being in the world – to reflect on myself is to change my self. And because 
we are together, that is to produce change within difference. 
  To think of myself as a woman I need a man, as The Man, to relate this to (Irigaray [1977]1985, 
1980v), otherwise that me as woman would mean nothing at all. And is that not really so? The 
demarcation of me as a woman mean absolutely nothing at all – if it was not for that I have produced 
things, desires, pleasures in relation to that mark of womanness – I understand things, me as such a 
thingness able to reflect upon, through it, and that understanding - that reflexivity - is constructive, 
however not of “The woman” as actual, but of my life, and of me in the world – in a forever unreflected 
dislocating. The subversive life is not less dependent upon discourses claim to relate to - queer positions 
are as much a constructed concept as is man or woman, and these positions/concepts are equally 
dependent of each other. I would not want to be without that relation to the claim of my womanness, 
however destructive, however artificial it might be – things that I love, pleasures of creativity, become 
dependently within this relation. And as previously exemplified, would the trans-person want to be 
without the binary norm, to construct that transition in relation to? Perhaps you would, but it would not 
be trans then, it would be something else, for now un-attempted as a concept. And perhaps I would be 
fine without “The Woman” to, however I would need to find some other artefact of difference, some 
other claim of me, to relate to, to desire in relation to, to constructively attempt to reflect in relation to, 
and so catachrestically and productively dislocate into something else. And this is the point – to be that 
something, we need that something else to relate it to. That what presses >me> into being. My actual 
being in the world is the friction that emerges from when something that claims to limit my existence, 
claims that being into existence, and causes it to press upon those limits, to resist them, to relate to them, 
to change them, and so take place as something. 
Concluding reflection – the relationality that my being composes and the constructive 
friction that it assume 
The relation I was to understand trough my weaving, I have now come to conclude into a concept in 
itself. Through looking at the possible relations between discourse, subjectivity and materiality in the 
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situation of my own being, I have come to the conclusion that they through, or rather with or even in, 
my being, function as a relationality. A relationality that puts me in to a becoming state. I pose that this 
relationality constitute my, the subject’s, being in the world as a very devious, paradoxical but ever yet 
constructive situation. That is as dialectically constituted in dependency, through the relationality that 
they together compose: Through my being, materiality is engaged into an attempt to understand that 
materiality. In the relating to this understanding, bound to the secondary premise of discourse, my 
subjectivity in the form of a self-reflecting and >being> attempt where my desires are produced in 
relation to these claims of understanding, is taking form. The dislocating performative act of subjectivity 
takes place in the world, forming the materiality that I will yet again attempt to reflect on, thus involve 
myself in, and so change again, through my dislocating, turning practice.  
If these dimensions of materiality, discourse and subjectivity, that involves themselves in/with my 
being, can, as I suggest, only be considered as affecting my being as that very entangled involvement, as 
a relationality that they become through my being always in the world, then it is certainly important for 
analysis’ that consider any form of being of the individual in sociality and materiality, thus to feminist, 
intersectional or gender analysis. To understand a context or a subjectivity for example, it would not be 
sufficient to merely analyse a discourse, or the relation between discourse and materiality or discourse 
and subjectivity, but these three concepts needs to be analysed as intra-volved into each other, through 
me, thus creating further things through this entanglement than what they can ever imply in a separate 
state, to understand my being, my being together, and the possibilities of that being. Except the finding 
of change and origin, the composition of my being in the world as this relationality has implications for 
questions of agency, accountability, ethics, (the possibility of) freedom, reflexivity, togetherness, the 
subject, desire and creativity, some of which I will now engage in, after/through briefly outlining the 
content of what my weaving in this text has lead me to understand, my weave of understanding. 
The (non)origin of change 
The meeting of discourse, subjectivity and materiality forms into a realtionality that constitutes my 
being because all of these notions is me as part of the world, thus the origin of my subjectivity and act is 
not outside the composition of my own being. That I am already in the world means that I am always 
constituted in the relation to others in the world with whom I am here together. The experience of this 
material demarcation of difference makes also my limited, secondary understanding and impossible 
reflexive attempt always also part of that being, part of the world, so involved with materiality. My 
understanding funds the desires that makes me move, and thus my desires, built on an understanding of 
arbitrarily interpreted representations, are constructive for my movement of the world, even though they 
cannot be fulfilled. This means that also to change the world is within the premises of my own being. 
Subjectivity, that is the creativity of me as producing myself in the world through relating myself into 
something in itself, is a reaction of my situation of being in the world, where I function as an entangling 
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force of specificity through that the situation of being I am always in, premise my being also as an 
understanding attempt. In this situation of being thus, change is not an option but built into 
understanding’s premises as well as my understanding’s interaction in the world, as a dislocation of 
nothing actual into something always else, never, impossibly same. Change and difference is assured 
because we can never assemble a homogeneous interpretation around a point of reference in 
understanding. If we were indeed interpreting understanding’s reference to demarcations of difference 
(such as gender) in the same way, that would either entail that 1: we made that interpretation from 
identical positions and specificities of being - which cannot be when our positions are different because 
of understanding and materiality’s very involvement through our subjectivity, as the entanglement of 
our experienced being (where present and past experiences of matter, body, sociality, that in experience 
does not work as concepts, is intricately tangled up with my understanding attempt of these things, from 
this specificity of experience, that is dependent upon discursive realms that so entangles as discourse-
affect in this very experience) into a hybrid specificity from where my interpretation is made – or 2: that 
that reference had inherent meaning in itself, mediable to us. Both of these suggestions entail an essence 
that has been disproven by the very idea of discourse, and the proof of change in the world. Thus we 
cannot create actual sameness from that as if direction of discourse, it has no such substance to interpret 
“right”, however our need to understand with an understanding that is always limited, make us create 
things in relation to such point as if there – thus we both need such points as well as inevitably use them 
to create – in this way discourse is constructive only through the relationality of me. Within this 
relationality the two problems/questions posed - that of the originality of my act and that of change of 
discourses affect - is actually found as solutions in to each other. In the relationality that I constitute 
with my being in the world, the origin of my subjectivity, my performative act, cannot come from 
anything except from in a drive of creativity that is composed in my very being, but that is a being 
always in the world, thus in a dependency, and thus in this composition of my own being in the world, 
also change is made by my very being. Here in my situation of being, my subjectivity, my creativity, my 
specificity and my dependency thus my changing capacity is built into my existence, composing a 
relationality together with materiality and my understanding attempt of that materiality, as a 
consequence of this situation of being in the world. And this capacity that is the entanglement of me, 
cannot be anything but changing, cannot be the same, through my very existence I move, thus I move 
also the world I am always in.  
Discourse – subjectivity – materiality in me  
Yes, the answers to my posed problems has morphed into one another, because I find them in the 
relationality of materiality, discourse and subjectivity that so leads them to the composition of my very 
own being. The subject’s turning figure of attempted reflexivity, through this paradoxical deviousness, 
moves the world. It is in the subject that understanding is made, it is because of the subject in the world 
that the discursive secondary premise of understanding takes part in that world. The need to reflect upon 
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myself, and in the attempt to in relation to discursive claims define my self and there in become as a 
subjectivity with desires, that leads me to this movement that manifest me as partaking in the world, not 
merely as a body but as a desiring body, a creative body, comes from that I am already in this world 
together, where the materiality of my difference becomes apparent as an object in itself to attempt to 
understand. The dependency to the relation to that other in which I myself  become an object to reflect 
upon, and materiality an object to discuss and thus understand, is so already premised in my being. The 
reason for my performative act that moves the world, that creates inevitable change because no stability, 
but only this relationality of myself can direct it, is so within my own being as part of the world. No 
potential of me is so outside of this being.  
Me in the world is a relationality 
There is no pure impression of mine, because I am in the world. The conditions that makes matter 
inaccessible is already always in the conditions of me being in the world. Understandings secondary 
premise is in this situation as a condition not of me, but in me being in the world, together with others 
that are in the world. Understanding, instead of representing being, partakes in the construction of being 
in that my subjectivity and my act from that subjectivity is constructed as a relating to my inadequate 
understanding of the world. The inaccessibility of materiality into discourse, is constructive of 
materiality through that my subjectivity is enabled as a relating to discourse’s claim to represent matter, 
thus making me, my subjectivity and performance, (catachrestically) create something new (always 
unrepresented) in the world, inevitably change discourses meaning through the very conditions of my 
being. The (catachrestically) constructive inaccessibility of matter into understanding is also a 
consequence of the condition of my being in the world. The matter needs to be sensed to be attempted to 
be understood - sensed by me, thus involved into constructive movement through me. Yes, materiality 
needs to be in my being, for my indulgence in a understanding practice that dislocate, change and 
construct other things. Matter is the reason of discourse inability and so constructivity of unlimited but 
un-understood things. The actual me in the world in itself, is a node of perceived matter trying to 
understand that matter, making it change. Thus the me in the world in it self is the cause of movement.   
This devious point to what I relate 
The attempt to understand the world and myself in it, where my subjectivity and so creativity becomes 
in relation, is dependent upon discourse’s referring to material demarcations of meaning, such as my 
body, as if it has meaning/value. However because neither discourse in itself can create such a meaning, 
this is more as an as if reference to meaning made upon material stuff, but in relation to what claim I 
engage in my own interpretation of what that might be - inspiring my act, and so I take a creative, 
undetermined and ever un-understood part of the world through this involvement. Some kind of friction 
is induced with the claim of densities, that is my subjectivity. Through becoming in a dislocation 
through my understanding attempt, my act, my being, is always inaccessible to my reflection, however I 
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experience it – it is my being. In my reflecting attempts of that reference of being, in which my relating 
practice react and my subjectivity take place, the actual being that I attempt to refer to is already gone. 
Being, the material being, happens now, in an always unrepresented occasion that thence move through 
my dislocation when I attempt to reflect and represent it. There is no accurate mediable value with 
language beyond me, but trough being I am bound to that understanding attempt but failure, with what I 
involve myself in the world in a constructive but unreflected way. Who/what asks about meaning? It is 
the human whom by their very premise is ever bound to this question of What does this/ I mean? 
Subjectivity is the very result of that question that I through my existence in the world am bound to ask, 
and the question ends up in an answer to itself through its own conditioned deviousness, because this 
question and my attempt to answer it inseparably involves with the meaning I make – thus my meaning 
(my creativity and my ability) is paradoxically and quite ironically constituted into being through my 
very impossibility/inability to answer it. Meaning is made through that we constantly ask for it, but 
cannot establish it, cannot come to a conclusion around it, thus that I create something meaningful in 
that always misinterpretation of a non-substantial reference that I however need to make that 
constructive dislocation. I will never understand anything that I feel. But all that I don’t understand but 
feel and thus am bound to try to understand... that attempt will be constructive of all of what I will never 
understand. 
The friction that enable creativity in togetherness 
What I have explained is a situation created through the situation of my being, thus that is inevitable 
given my being, where my subjectivity is a relating practice of proceeding to understand the materiality 
I am, consist and create, and through the impossibility of that attempt, I do create an undetermined 
change in the world with my being – my creativity can do nothing but change because nothing is 
suggested. The claim of being as >something> that is a result of my understanding need but inability, 
thus enable my entanglement with it into creative dislocation of what that being might be. A Hegelian 
dialectic that constitute me only in relation to something else, thus in an actual inseparability, would so 
refer to a relation where nothing actually understood can be related to, but related to nevertheless as if 
there as a reference, and only the relating in itself a constructive becoming of a synthesis – what that 
synthesis is, is beyond my reflection, always. This dialectical relating I am always in, is constructive, 
not of something defined, but within the relationality that here take place. The situation of my creativity 
in the togetherness of the earth which I am always in, is thus that in this togetherness that I become in 
relation to, >togetherness> cannot be considered, but only the difference offered in it. – To become 
something always undefined, I need to understand myself as something else, in relation to difference 
from me. We are here together but we need to understand us as not if we are to be constructive. 
  The solution of our situation as a collective in a climate crisis so comes if we part from the 
philosophical suggestion/vision that is symbolically painted by this crisis - that of a joint human kind, or 
even earthly kind, because it is impossible to create a self in relation to that reference – a reference 
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without a differating principal to relate and so create substance to. The true collective that this earthly 
kind is, is referentially impossible, unqualified as a reference for my subjective relating, thus it is 
creatively inefficient for me to relate to create subjectivity and so change. Not only is the vision of a 
collective earthly struggle impossible and unproductive, but it is ironically and paradoxically so because 
we are dependent. We are dependently joined through our constitution into each other as to create a self 
on the principal of separation. My subjectivity, or rather, the being of me in the world as composing a 
relationality (where subjectivity happen) is a creational force. Thus subjectivity is what’s disrupts the 
status quo we seem to be invi, entertaining passivity. The salvation to our common challenge is 
paradoxically to reject the idea of a collective, to disrupt the philosophical sameness, it is to create and 
enhance difference. The climate crisis needs to be used as a reference of claimed difference in relation to 
which we can relate our selves, and so creatively turn around in our misinterpretation of that self, and 
change what we are doing. We are not the same in relation to the climate crises, there are endless 
possibilities to create difference and so subjectivity around it, and so inevitably change our being in 
relation to it (which we will inevitably do, but let’s hurry this up!). I need to drag my >self> into this 
equation, that I am in so many ways already in. We need to get creative around this challenge, to get to 
action, and so we need to relate our selves to differences involved in it. Let’s start to talk about those 
differences, let’s get antagonist, create belongings, around this challenge we are all part of, but still very 
different in. 
Freedom through dependency 
What I have explained to be taking place is a dependency relation of these dimensions of materiality, 
discourse and subjectivity as a relationality, that is composed into entanglement with my being in the 
world, that catachrestically displaces all intention, all meaning, but that creates a movement that so is 
the consequence of my existence. I as a specific being compose a relationality that gives me the 
capability to interact with the world and through the specificity of my dependency inevitably change it 
with my mere being or rather ever becoming. And these conditions of me that are also the composition 
of me, that also makes my impact as something in myself, are the result of my actual being always in the 
world. This means that I matter in the world, my existence matter. I make a change into indetermination 
that would not be if I was not.  
If my affect or agency becomes through the impossibility to do what I desire to do, because my desires 
are created in relation to my attempted understanding of a point of reference that does not exist with 
value/meaning apart from this relating, it means that my act is both a result of my own desire – my own 
being, at the same time that it is stripped from any sense of free will or determination, both from outside 
me or inside me. My affect, my power to change, happen through this very deviousness. If I am not 
conceptualizable in to concepts, that means that I am fundamentally free. I am free because I am 
indefinable into determination, and so is my understanding of >things> (matter), in relation to what I 
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might otherwise have been able to be stabilized. I am free because there is nothing outside my situation 
of being in the world as a relationality to direct me, and that being composes a relationality that ensures 
change. Paradoxically, however, it is this situation of being always in utter dependency that assures my 
freedom, the un-directability of my act, my undetermined possibility. I am indeterminately becoming 
through dislocating my being in a relating practise to the world I am in together. My actions become 
through the desire made in my fundamental incapability but attempt to reflect upon this freedom. This is 
a freedom that I can never reflect upon, it is inaccessible to me, to my will, I cannot really appreciate it 
as it is, but at the same time I experience it, I have it in this very devious sense. Thus it is not a freedom 
of will, because of that I cannot myself determine, because I cannot reflect upon, what my potential in 
this freedom might be, I cannot myself direct what I become. This is how I am essentially free of 
determination and so free in the only sense possible, through that I am always dependent, through that 
relationality that my being in the world compose. And I see after all, that is really all that I want. A 
premise of an absolute freedom of would require the ability to navigate in nothingness. My creativity, 
my being is always creating through relating. Densities must appear as pressing upon me, for the 
friction of my subjectivity to emerge. Absolute freedom of will is an impossibility even with my being, 
because that nothingness is a non-situation in my being in the world. That freedom would be a 
nothingness where no desires, no pleasures could be related into becoming. In that freedom, no will can 
become. In that nothingness I have never been. 
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Notes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  i	  My notion of performativity thus might be said to differ somewhat from Butler’s (depending on how 
Butler is read), but through actually building on Butlers own assumptions, in that it does not locate the 
origin of my act, thus my subjectivity, in discourse it self, when I locate discourse necessarily as a result 
of my own being in the world, not as anything in itself, proven by the idea of the secondary status of 
discourse, through that it is made from my understanding and so conceptualizing perspective, that the 
Foucauldian and Butlarian concept of discourse itself derives from. Butler ([1990]2007) focus on the 
being of the subject (performativity) as happening only in its relation to an otherness from it, thus trough 
the act in relation to discourse and sociality where ‘there is no doer behind the deed’. I both counter and 
at the same time build upon this relational function as constituting for the act of my subjectivity in that 
my subjectivity, and so perfromativity, become only through a relating practice because of my own 
attempt to understand my self and the world, I render as coming from my own being, as something, in 
the world. - Hence always in this relation, but still something in myself that collect the entangling 
capacity of materiality, discourse and subjectivity. 	  	  ii	  The most clear manifestation of discourses involvement in the materiality that I experience and that so 
in turn affects my interpretation of discursive meaning thus my performative actions, is how societal 
structures, institutions, laws etc are always somewhat constructed and altered according to discourse as 
if it had an inherent meaning. The material consequences of these structures such as the reproduction of 
socioeconomic hierarchies and power-relations and my position in these are of course essential to my 
experience and interpretation of the world and me in it, thus my performativity. These structural 
material manifestations of discourse’s claim to truth is not shed into light in this specific text, but it is 
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very important to state that I do consider them actual, as well as part of what I describe, and that they are 
part of what I suggest as functioning in a relationality. I do suggest that what is suggested by these 
structures are not materialized as if it was anything, but they are related to, and in relation to the 
materiality that these structures produce we need to produce our lives, thus discourse is here functioning 
through our inevitable relating and practice in relation to these structurally organized material 
consequences - but it is a relating that is made in diverse manners. And so what is discursively claimed 
as a (intersectional) social group, both is actually a social group because we inevitably need to relate to 
that claim and the material circumstances produced through the societal structures that act on these 
claims as if actually claiming something in itself, and that claiming actually representing a truth – that 
structuring in relation so making the discursive clam into a truth regime as if bearing meaning in itself – 
but functioning in fact only through an arbitrariness that we are hopelessly but constructively fated to. 
But the intersectional social group is also not at all that what is claimed, even if it needs to be seen also 
as never rid of that claim, but extensively more or other than that claim that claims to define us and that 
we so relate to to understand ourselves and thus in some sense confirm that claim. 
iii	  As does the dominant norm, such as whiteness, has that characteristic of domination of making all 
difference from it define itself always in dependent relation to it.  	  iv	  The concept of becoming was termed by Deleuze and amongst other used by Braidotti (2002) to refer 
to the subject’s ever becoming state, that the subject never >is> something static, but through its 
connectivity to all around it, it continuously transform. 	  v	  However, my view of the necessity of this relating point to do a constructive arbitrary relating and so 
dislocation of what this woman-sign mean, constructive also through being dependent upon the 
dialectical relation to the Man, might differ from Irigary’s when she proposes a disruption of this 
dependency for the woman to create her own experiences through changing the words in language’s 
phallogocentric symbolic system (Braidotti 2002; Irigaray 1980). My view on the arbitrariness and thus 
changeability of meaning onto signs, through this dependency being hybrid, is perhaps what makes my 
opinion be that the meaning is already in transformation, and it is always transforming in this 
dependency to be defined in relation to the man. 	  vi	  A real status quo, however, I suggest is not a possibility when change is built into the human premises.	  
